2012年-世界发展银行全球_Strengthening_PFM_in_Post-Conflict_Countries___Lessons_for_PFM_Practitioners_and_Country_Programming_Staff_10页_640kb

Summary of Strengthening PFM in Postconflict Countries

Core Content

This document provides an analysis of public financial management (PFM) reforms in eight postconflict countries, focusing on the challenges, opportunities, and outcomes of these reforms from the early 2000s to 2010. It emphasizes the importance of context-specific approaches, the role of political commitment, and the need for sustained capacity development in strengthening PFM systems. The analysis is based on a cross-country review and includes lessons for PFM practitioners and country programming staff.

Main Findings

1. PFM Progress in Postconflict Countries

   • Four out of eight countries made significant progress in PFM reforms.
   • Two countries achieved intermediate progress.
   • Only one country (Congo, DRC) showed limited progress.
   • PFM progress is closely linked to the presence of enabling drivers such as international recognition, aid reliance, and security support.

2. Reform Focus and Progress Across the Budget Cycle

   • Budget execution reforms advanced more significantly than budget planning or budget accountability.
   • Early stages of reform often focused on cash management, treasury single accounts (TSAs), and financial reporting systems.
   • Budget accountability (e.g., external audit) is the most challenging aspect due to its reliance on political commitment and checks and balances.

3. Capacity Development

   • Technical assistants and salary top-ups were used extensively to supplement capacity in the short to medium term.
   • Middle-income countries (e.g., Kosovo) were more successful in building long-term capacity.
   • Lower-income countries face persistent challenges in capacity development, requiring longer-term investment.

4. Impact on State-Building and Service Delivery

   • PFM reforms contributed to state resilience and corruption reduction.
   • However, service delivery improvements were not clearly linked to PFM progress, indicating a missing link between financial reforms and performance outcomes.

5. PFM Reform Trajectories and Drivers

   • Reform design and progression vary based on existing PFM systems, country characteristics, and political commitment.
   • Legal frameworks for PFM are typically adopted 3–5 years post-conflict, once institutional processes are in place.
   • FMIS (Financial Management Information System) implementation was successful in some countries but delayed or incomplete in others, highlighting the need for flexibility and context-aware planning.

6. Role of Donor Support

   • Donor support has had a positive impact on PFM reforms, especially through PEFA assessments.
   • However, donor involvement remains fragmented and disconnected from broader public sector reforms and sector-specific initiatives.

Key Implications

1. Government Commitment to Reform

• Political commitment is a critical driver of PFM reform success.
• Strong commitment is often linked to state-building goals or international recognition.
• In environments with weak commitment, initial steps and stakeholder dialogue are essential to build momentum.
• Donors should support reform champions and ensure continuity despite high ministerial turnover.

2. Focus on Execution Reforms

• Budget execution reforms (e.g., TSAs, accounting systems) are more feasible in the early stages of postconflict recovery.
• Subnational implementation is crucial for state reach and expenditure transparency.
• FMIS development should be prioritized, but must be adapted to local contexts and capabilities.

3. Sustained Capacity Development

• Capacity is a major constraint, especially in low-income postconflict countries.
• Donor support through technical assistance and salary top-ups can be effective in the short term.
• Long-term capacity development requires institutional training and human resource reforms to reduce turnover and improve incentives.

4. Realistic Reform Steps and Bottleneck Identification

• PFM reforms should be designed based on bottleneck analysis and realistic timelines.
• A phased approach is recommended, with shorter-term plans (18 months to 3–4 years) to adapt to changing political and institutional landscapes.
• Avoiding rigid sequences and focusing on immediate feasibility (e.g., budget reporting, cash management) is more effective than pursuing idealistic reform models.

5. Integration of Aid and Institutional Reforms

• Aid integration into national budgets is essential for transparency and accountability.
• Merging finance and planning functions can improve coordination, but must be done carefully to avoid superficial institutional changes.
• Temporary arrangements for sovereignty over public funds can be beneficial in contexts with deep integrity issues.

6. Exit Strategies and Sustainability

• Temporary international oversight arrangements can help secure PFM improvements.
• However, exit strategies and sustainability of reforms must be carefully planned to ensure long-term impact.
• Donors should avoid overloading the reform agenda and instead focus on gradual, evidence-based progress.

Conclusion

PFM reforms in postconflict countries are complex and context-dependent. While progress is possible, it is often limited by political commitment, capacity constraints, and institutional challenges. Donors and practitioners must adopt flexible, realistic, and context-sensitive approaches, focusing on execution reforms, capacity development, and sustainable institutional arrangements to support effective state-building and service delivery.