2003年-世界发展银行全球_Rules_of_Thumb_for_Evaluating_Preferential_Trading_Arrangements___Evidence_from_Computable_General_Equilibrium_Assessments_10页_159kb

Summary of Rules of Thumb for Evaluating Preferential Trading Arrangements: Evidence from Computable General Equilibrium Assessments

Core Content

This document presents a set of rules of thumb derived from computable general equilibrium (CGE) models to evaluate the welfare effects of Preferential Trade Arrangements (PTAs), particularly Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) and Customs Unions (CUs). The authors, Glenn W. Harrison, Thomas F. Rutherford, and David G. Tarr, analyze the impacts of regional trade agreements on various countries, including Chile, the United States, Mexico, and the European Union, using both static and dynamic models. The findings are based on elasticity assumptions and tax replacement mechanisms, and they emphasize the importance of market access, tax efficiency, and poverty impacts in assessing the benefits of regional integration.

Main Conclusions

1. Countries Excluded from a PTA Almost Always Lose

• Excluded countries experience welfare losses due to trade diversion effects, where partner countries gain preferential access to markets, reducing demand for exports from excluded countries.
• Example: Chile loses $169 million/year from a FTA with MERCOSUR and $384 million/year from an agreement with NAFTA.
• Reason: Partner countries benefit from reduced trade barriers, which discourages imports from excluded countries.

2. Market Access is a Key Determinant of Net Benefits

• Market access significantly influences the net gains or losses from PTAs.
• Northern countries (e.g., EU, NAFTA) offer greater market access, which increases the likelihood of beneficial outcomes for Southern countries.
• Chile's FTA with NAFTA benefits it, while FTA with MERCOSUR leads to losses, due to limited market access.

3. A FTA Can Be Attractive Even with a Poor External Tariff

• A common external tariff (CU) may not be beneficial if it imposes distortionary tariffs on certain goods.
• Chile would gain from a FTA with MERCOSUR if the external tariff were reduced to 6%, as opposed to the 11% uniform tariff.
• FTAs allow for unilateral liberalization, which is not possible under a CU.

4. North-South Agreements Benefit Southern Countries

• Southern countries gain from North-South FTAs due to increased competition in their home markets and lower supply prices from Northern partners.
• Example: Chile-NAFTA and EU-Morocco agreements benefit Southern countries.
• Northern countries provide additional supply without raising prices, which is beneficial for Southern economies.

5. Multilateral Trade Liberalization Yields Larger Global Gains

• Multilateral liberalization results in much larger global gains than a network of regional arrangements.
• Even the most beneficial regional agreement (e.g., FTA of the Americas + EU-MERCOSUR) only yields $46 billion/year in global gains, which is still less than the gains from global free trade.
• Trade diversion effects reduce the overall benefits of regional arrangements.

6. "Additive Regionalism" Offers Greater Gains Than Unilateral Liberalization

• Countries that negotiate multiple FTAs with various trading partners (e.g., Chile) benefit much more than those that liberalize trade unilaterally.
• Unilateral liberalization for Chile yields ~0.1% GDP gain, while additive regionalism can yield multiple times that.
• No product restrictions in FTAs maximize gains.

7. Tax Replacement Requirements Reduce the Attractiveness of PTAs

• Tariff revenue loss from PTAs is often replaced with other taxes, such as VAT, which can introduce distortions.
• In Chile, the marginal cost of public funds (MCF) from VAT is 7.6%, indicating welfare losses from tax replacement.
• Tax reform is inevitable in the context of regional trade agreements due to government budget constraints.

8. Trade Taxes Are Often Inefficient

• Chilean tariffs have a higher MCF than VAT, even though they are uniform.
• The geographical discrimination of tariffs favors domestic sectors and taxes imports, leading to distortions.
• VAT is less distortionary, but still inefficient in some cases.

9. Trade Liberalization is Pro-Poor in Developing Countries

• Open trade tends to benefit the poor, but household-level outcomes vary.
• Brazil shows progressive distribution of gains from trade liberalization, with the poorest households gaining 3–4 times the average.
• Safety nets are crucial to protect vulnerable households that may lose from trade reforms, especially in the short run.

10. Dynamic Effects Do Not Reverse Regionalism Conclusions

• Dynamic models do not significantly change welfare outcomes from PTAs.
• Capital stock optimization in the steady state means that trade liberalization may not improve welfare beyond static estimates.
• Dynamic trade diversion can occur due to technology and productivity spillovers, but only if the partner is technologically advanced.

Key Information

• CGE models are used to evaluate the economic impact of PTAs, as theoretical results are often ambiguous.
• Market access is a critical factor in determining the net benefits of a PTA.
• Northern partners generally provide more beneficial outcomes for Southern countries.
• Tax replacement introduces distortions, reducing the attractiveness of PTAs.
• Trade taxes are less efficient than VAT in some cases.
• Trade liberalization is pro-poor, but safety nets are needed to mitigate household-level disparities.
• Dynamic models do not reverse the negative impacts of regional arrangements.

Table of Welfare Impacts (in millions of 1995 U.S. dollars)

• Negative values indicate losses, while positive values indicate gains.
• Chile benefits most from FTAs with Northern partners and loses from Southern PTAs.
• Global free trade yields the highest gains among all scenarios.

Keywords

• Preferential Trade Integration
• Computable General Equilibrium
• Welfare Gains
• Market Access
• Tax Replacement
• Trade Taxes
• Poverty Reduction
• Regional Arrangements
• Dynamic Effects

JEL Categories

• F15: Trade and Investment
• F02: International Economic Integration
• C68: Computational Economics

References

• Bakoup & Tarr (2000), Coe et al. (1997), Dollar & Kraay (2001), HRT (1997a, 1997b, 2001, 2002, 2003), Rutherford & Tarr (2002), Schiff & Wang (forthcoming), Schiff & Winters (2003), and others.