2014年-CEPS欧洲政策研究中心_Will_the_European_Council_end_the_institutional_deadlock_in_the_EU_The_Narrow_Trail_to_an_Agreement_8页_118kb

Summary of "Will the European Council end the institutional deadlock in the EU?"

Core Content

The document discusses the possibility of resolving the institutional deadlock in the European Union (EU) through a revised treaty structure, particularly in the context of the 2009 European elections. It outlines the conditions under which a meaningful agreement can be reached and proposes a feasible path forward that respects the demands of key member states while preserving the essence of the Constitutional Treaty (CT).

Main Views

• The Need for Institutional Reform: The EU is facing a significant institutional stalemate, primarily due to the rejection of the CT in France and the Netherlands. A new agreement is necessary to improve the functioning and democratic accountability of EU institutions.
• Balancing Member State Interests: A successful agreement must respect the red lines of France, the Netherlands, and the UK, which are against constitutional symbolism and the transfer of sovereign powers to the EU. At the same time, it must satisfy the demands of the 18 member states that have ratified the CT.
• Treaty Structure and Functioning: The CT's Part I contains general institutional provisions, while Part III addresses specific policies. The document suggests that the TEU should retain the institutional framework, and the TEC should handle specific policies and detailed institutional rules. This would reinforce the "two-treaty-structure" and simplify EU governance.
• Legal and Symbolic Adjustments: The CT's name and constitutional references should be dropped to avoid referendums. However, the essence of the CT, such as the Charter of Fundamental Rights, should be preserved through legal references rather than direct incorporation.
• Future Institutional Improvements: The document outlines several long-term considerations, including a simplified revision process, a more flexible Commission structure, and the constructive use of flexibility mechanisms.

Key Information

1. Conditions for Agreement

• Part I of the CT must be preserved: This includes the EU's objectives, values, competences, and institutional framework.
• Part III and IV can be retained as protocols or amendments: These provisions relate to common policies and future treaty revisions.
• No new referendum is required: France, the Netherlands, and the UK demand this, which influences the tone and structure of the new treaty.
• Constitutional symbols must be removed: This includes the term "Constitutional Treaty" and any references to a constitution.

2. Institutional Reforms

• Single Legal Personality of the Union: This should be confirmed to enhance the Union's capacity to act and its international image.
• Elimination of the Pillar Structure: The EU should move away from the current three-pillar structure to a more coherent institutional framework.
• Revised Commission Structure: The Commission should be reformed to ensure equal rotation of member states and a more flexible appointment process.
• Reinforcement of the TEU as the 'fundamental law': The TEU would govern the institutional framework, while the TEC would focus on specific policies.

3. Legal and Policy Adjustments

• Charter of Fundamental Rights: It should be referenced in the new treaty rather than incorporated directly to avoid UK and Dutch objections.
• Flexibility Mechanisms: These should be used constructively to address divergent national interests, not as threats to integration.
• Red Card Procedure: This is not recommended, as it could lead to excessive veto power and hinder decision-making.

4. Future Considerations

• Super-Qualified Majority for Treaty Revisions: A new mechanism, such as the one proposed by MEP Andrew Duff, could allow for easier amendments to non-fundamental treaty provisions, promoting more dynamic EU development.
• European-wide Policy Debates: The document suggests that the EU should foster European-wide debates on policies to enhance legitimacy and create a sense of European identity.
• Role of National Parliaments: They should act as "watchdogs" for subsidiarity, not as veto mechanisms, to maintain a balance between EU and national interests.

Conclusion

The document argues that a viable solution to the EU's institutional deadlock is possible if the negotiations focus on the core institutional provisions of the CT while removing its constitutional symbolism. It emphasizes the importance of maintaining the balance of interests among member states and suggests that future reforms should include a more flexible and democratic treaty structure, with a clear distinction between fundamental law and policy-specific provisions.