斯德哥尔摩国际和平研究所-The-Soviet-Nuclear-Weapon-Legacy_142页_7mb

The Soviet Nuclear Weapon Legacy Summary

Core Content

This report, published by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) in 1995, provides an analysis of the Soviet Union's nuclear weapon legacy following its dissolution. It focuses on the transition of the former Soviet Union (FSU) from a nuclear superpower to a non-nuclear state, examining the challenges and progress in nuclear disarmament, control, and the transformation of the nuclear complex.

Main Points

1. Introduction

• The Soviet nuclear weapon complex is described as a "moving target" due to its rapid transformation after the Union's breakup.
• The report aims to provide an overview of the current and future state of the FSU nuclear arsenal, highlighting the need for stability and international security.
• It emphasizes the importance of controlling nuclear materials and facilities to prevent proliferation and promote peaceful use.

2. Consolidating the Nuclear Arsenal

• Quantitative Overview:
  • By mid-1993, the FSU was estimated to have around 32,000 nuclear warheads, with 15,000 active and 17,000 in storage or awaiting dismantlement.
  • The US estimated that Russia had about 25,000 nuclear weapons in early 1994, with no clear breakdown between active and reserve stockpiles.
• Geographic Distribution:
  • Strategic nuclear weapons were concentrated in Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine.
  • Tactical nuclear weapons were deployed across all 15 republics.
• Disarmament Progress:
  • By mid-1994, many tactical nuclear weapons had been withdrawn from Eastern Europe, including from Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia.
  • Ukraine joined the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in December 1994, contributing to the goal of a single nuclear state successor to the Soviet Union.
• Strategic Forces:
  • As of late 1994, strategic nuclear forces were still largely located in Russia, with some in Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan.
  • Ukraine had 1,374 warheads across various delivery systems, including ICBMs and bombers.
  • Kazakhstan had 920 warheads, including 40 Bear-H bombers and 12 SS-18 ICBMs.
  • Belarus had 36 warheads from SS-25 ICBMs.

3. Controlling the Nuclear Arsenal

• The report discusses the technical and procedural measures for controlling the FSU nuclear arsenal, including:
  • Negative and Positive Control: Systems to ensure that nuclear weapons are not used or transferred.
  • Authority to Launch: The shift in command and control structures post-Soviet dissolution.
  • Safeguards: Measures to prevent unauthorized access and proliferation.
  • No-First-Use Policy: Russia abandoned this policy, increasing concerns about nuclear readiness.
• Command and Control: The report highlights the need for improved transparency and accountability in nuclear command structures.

4. Running the Dismantlement Pipeline

• The process of dismantling nuclear warheads involves:
  • Disabling Warheads: Techniques to render them non-functional.
  • Transportation and Storage: Ensuring safe movement and secure storage of warheads.
  • Conversion to Pits: The dismantling process includes removing warheads to pits.
  • Fissile Material Disposition: Efforts to manage and dispose of weapon-grade materials like plutonium and uranium.

5. Preventing a 'Brain Drain'

• The report addresses the issue of skilled personnel leaving the nuclear complex, known as the 'brain drain'.
• People and Laboratories: Many scientists and engineers from the nuclear industry were at risk of transferring their expertise to non-state actors or other countries.
• Closed Cities: These were nuclear-related industrial centers with restricted access, contributing to the secrecy and difficulty in monitoring the nuclear complex.

6. Preventing Leakage of Fissile Materials

• The report examines the sources of fissile materials and the measures to prevent their transfer.
• Production and Storage: Highlighting the risks of interim storage and the role of the Russian nuclear industry in managing these materials.
• Export Controls: The FSU had limited export controls, raising concerns about the potential for nuclear proliferation.

7. Arms Control and Nuclear Weapons in the FSU

• The report reviews major arms control agreements and initiatives, including:
  • START I and II: Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties that aimed to reduce nuclear arsenals.
  • Detargeting Agreements: Efforts to remove nuclear weapons from operational readiness.
  • Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT): A proposed treaty to halt the production of fissile materials for weapons.
  • Ban on Nuclear Testing: Part of broader arms control efforts.
  • Verification: The importance of transparent verification mechanisms to ensure compliance.

8. International Denuclearization Assistance

• The Nunn-Lugar Program (US) played a significant role in assisting the FSU with nuclear disarmament.
• Other international efforts included:
  • Science and Technology Centres: Supporting the transition of nuclear facilities to civilian use.
  • Storage Facilities: For Russian plutonium, ensuring safe handling and disposal.
• The report notes that these assistance programs, though small in comparison to defense budgets, have provided substantial security benefits.

9. Conclusions

• The FSU nuclear custodial system is assessed for its safety and stability.
• A verified global inventory of nuclear warheads and fissile material is recommended to ensure transparency and prevent proliferation.
• The report concludes that the transition from a nuclear superpower to a non-nuclear state is a critical and complex process with far-reaching implications for global security.

Key Information

• The Soviet nuclear arsenal was one of the largest in the world, with over 32,000 warheads by mid-1993.
• Nuclear weapons were primarily located in Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine, with the latter three having significant strategic stockpiles.
• The Nunn-Lugar Program and other international assistance programs were crucial in supporting the FSU's denuclearization.
• The dismantlement process includes disabling warheads, transporting them to secure sites, and converting them to peaceful uses.
• The abandonment of the no-first-use policy by Russia raises concerns about nuclear readiness and security.
• The transition of the FSU nuclear complex is part of a broader transformation involving political, economic, military, and ecological dimensions.

Tables and Figures

• Table 2.1: Breakdown of nuclear weapon deployments in the FSU as of early 1991.
• Table 2.2: Locations of active strategic forces in the FSU as of late 1994.
• Table 2.3: Strategic nuclear weapons of the FSU outside Russia as of late 1994.
• Maps (Figures 2.1-2.4): Show sites of proliferation concern in Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine.

Authors and Acknowledgements

• Marco De Andreis and Francesco Calogero are the authors of the report.
• The report was supported by the Pugwash Conferences and the European Union.
• SIPRI Director Adam Daniel Rotfeld expressed gratitude for the authors' comprehensive work.

Abbreviations and Acronyms

• ALCM: Air-launched cruise missile
• ASAT: Anti-satellite
• CIS: Commonwealth of Independent States
• START: Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
• NPT: Non-Proliferation Treaty
• MTCR: Missile Technology Control Regime
• ICBM: Intercontinental ballistic missile
• SSBN: Nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarine
• CTBT: Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
• DOE: Department of Energy (USA)
• DOD: Department of Defense (USA)
• CIA: Central Intelligence Agency (USA)
• MOX: Mixed oxide
• EAR: Estimated assured resources
• RAR: Reasonably assured resources
• PAL: Permissive action link
• LCC: Launch control centre
• FSU: Former Soviet Union

Conclusion

The Soviet nuclear weapon legacy remains a critical topic for global security, with the FSU's transition to a non-nuclear state requiring careful management. The report underscores the importance of international cooperation, verification, and transparency in ensuring the safe and secure dismantlement of the Soviet nuclear arsenal.