战略与国际研究中心-Weapons-of-Mass-Destruction-and-Arms-Control-in-the-Middle-East_50页_155kb

Summary of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Arms Control in the Middle East

Core Content

This document by Anthony H. Cordesman, dated March 2000, examines the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and arms control efforts in the Middle East. It highlights the challenges and uncertainties associated with regional security, the role of technological advancements, and the limitations of existing arms control agreements.

Main Points and Key Information

Proliferation is Already Here

• Israel possesses nuclear weapons and relies on deterrence and preemptive strikes.
• Iran has chemical and likely biological weapons, with ongoing nuclear development.
• Iraq has a history of WMD development and could rapidly break out if containment fails.
• Syria has significant chemical capabilities and is likely to acquire biological ones.
• Libya continues its chemical weapons program.
• Algeria and Egypt are uncertain in their WMD development paths.
• Saudi Arabia is considering WMD options due to regional instability.
• Terrorists and proxies may also acquire these capabilities.

The Current Track: Reasons for Proliferating Outweigh Perceived Risks

• Prestige and deterrence are key motivations for WMD acquisition.
• War fighting strategies increasingly rely on WMDs to avoid conventional defeat.
• Regional arms races (e.g., Algeria-Libya-Morocco, Egypt-Israel-Syria, Iran-Iraq-Southern Gulf) contribute to instability.
• Uncertainty in identifying enemies and allies complicates risk assessment.
• Preemption and launch under attack are seen as strategic options.
• Covert and asymmetric methods, including biological and chemical attacks, are becoming more viable.

Unstable Patterns of War Fighting and Escalation

• Multipolar arms races make conflict containment difficult.
• New technologies with limited combat experience increase unpredictability.
• Covert operations and denial of capabilities complicate understanding of enemy actions.
• Existential threats are a concern due to the concentration of populations and leadership in urban areas.
• Unconventional warfare and mass terrorism are growing risks, especially with biological weapons.

Major Uncertainties

• Identification of enemies and allies is unclear.
• Accuracy, reliability, and effectiveness of WMDs are uncertain.
• Lack of full operational testing for many WMD systems.
• Inaccurate targeting and random impact due to poor data.
• Different perceptions of escalation and values among states.
• Risk of total war with the use of infectious agents.
• Instability of preemption and launch options.
• Martyrdom and doomsday machines pose unpredictable risks.
• Uncertain impact on conventional conflict and civil defense capabilities.

Technological Developments and Imperatives (2010–2020)

Missiles and Delivery Systems

• Satellite targeting and GPS data improve accuracy.
• Cheap cruise missiles and drones are becoming more accessible.
• Indigenous production of long-range missiles is possible.
• Smart warheads and high terminal velocity systems are in development.
• Rapid conversion of aircraft to unmanned delivery systems.
• Covert delivery systems and delayed effects are emerging.

Chemical Weapons

• Rapid, covert production of chemical precursors.
• Binary nerve agents and mustard gas are being developed.
• Cocktail weapons aim to bypass antidotes and protection.
• Breakout facilities allow for quick conversion to production.
• Cluster munitions and advanced targeting systems enhance capabilities.

Biological Weapons

• Genetic engineering enables weaponization of new agents.
• Dry, storable agents and aerosol forms are becoming more common.
• Covert mass production is feasible using existing industrial infrastructure.
• No distinction between defensive and offensive research.
• Small-scale labs can produce lethal biological agents.
• Biotechnology advances make covert production easier.

Nuclear Weapons

• Improved understanding of nuclear designs and computer modeling.
• Reduced fissile material needs and weapon weight.
• Centrifuge technology and reactor conversion are advancing.
• Non-fissile testing is possible with advanced simulations.
• Highly sophisticated delivery systems and covert capabilities are under development.

Counterproliferation and Defensive Options

• Defensive systems include improved missile and air defenses.
• Chemical and biological detection and warning systems are being enhanced.
• Civil defense and treatment systems are under development.
• Satellite surveillance and Sigint/Comint systems improve targeting.
• Covert sensors and UAVs enhance monitoring capabilities.

Current Arms Control Agreements

• R = Ratified, S = Signed, A = Acceded, NA = Not Applicable, SRR = Signed - Ratification Required, NSRR = Not Signed - Ratification Required

Key Supplier Control Groups

• Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), 1987: Controls export of missile-related technologies.
• Wassenaar Arrangement, 1996: Multilateral export control for conventional and dual-use items.
• Australia Group, 1984: Focuses on controlling chemical and biological precursors and equipment.

Impact of Arms Control Agreements

• Missile proliferation is slowed but not stopped.
• Chemical proliferation is limited but not fully controlled.
• Biological proliferation faces strong political deterrence but lacks enforcement.
• Nuclear proliferation is curtailed but not eliminated.
• Verification is a major challenge, especially for biological and chemical weapons.
• Dual-use technologies enable covert WMD development.
• IAEA safeguards and inspections help but can be manipulated.

Regional Arms Control Options

Goals and Objectives

• Build trust and advance peace.
• Provide warning and confidence-building measures.
• Limit arms races and reduce military spending.
• Deter rogue states and prevent escalation.
• Avoid misunderstandings and unnecessary conflict.
• Stabilize mutual deterrence.
• Reduce war risks and costs.
• Minimize countervalue and existential threats.
• Reduce deployed weapons and systems.

Major Risks

• Breakout in biological and chemical weapons.
• Squeezing the balloon effect: limiting one area increases activity elsewhere.
• Liar's contest: states may sign agreements but violate them.
• Only the honest suffer: moderate states may be penalized.
• War fighting risk: increased covert proliferation.
• Existential minimalism: reducing weapons may increase "use or lose" risk.
• Destabilizing truth: transparency may stimulate arms races.
• Climate of illusions: verification may give false stability.
• Conventional paradox: reducing WMDs increases conventional war risk.
• Nth Weapon problem: few concealed weapons can cause massive damage.
• Valid paranoia: arms control may encourage covert attacks.

Arms Control, Deterrence, and Counterproliferation

• Arms control alone is insufficient; it must be paired with deterrence and counterproliferation.
• Extended deterrence and compellance are important for maintaining regional stability.
• Conventional deterrence is critical for preventing conflict escalation.
• Regional counterproliferation policies are necessary to address the growing threat of WMDs.
• U.S. perspective on counterproliferation includes improving intelligence, surveillance, and military capabilities.

Conclusion

The Middle East faces significant challenges in controlling the proliferation of WMDs. While arms control agreements and supplier control groups provide some framework, they are often insufficient due to the region's political instability, technological advancements, and the presence of covert and asymmetric capabilities. A comprehensive regional approach is needed to address these issues effectively.