2023-06-26-IMF-数字支付垄断下的银行竞争与家庭隐私（英）_55页_713kb

Digital payment monopolies enable tech firms to collect extensive household data, exacerbating bank competition issues and creating trade-offs between privacy and credit access. The monopolist strategically sets data intrusiveness to exploit bank market power, leading to inefficient outcomes and negative welfare due to disclosure cascades. In good times, unregulated markets suffer from privacy costs and aggregate deadweight losses, while in bad times, data may boost credit inclusion. Optimal regulation involves constraining data collection to balance privacy with credit access, especially when both payment options have strong market uptake. Second instruments like taxes or subsidies on data use can improve welfare by partially offsetting the need for stringent regulation, allowing policymakers to fine-tune the trade-off between privacy and efficient credit markets.

Conclusions emphasize that digital payment systems can significantly amplify existing market externalities, and policymakers must consider dynamic economic states and market power to design effective responses.