期刊-NBER美国国民经济研究局-2012no3_36页_2mb

NBER Reporter Summary - 2012, Number 3

Core Content

This issue of the NBER Reporter presents a lecture by Steven N. Kaplan on Executive Compensation and Corporate Governance in the U.S.: Perceptions, Facts, and Challenges, alongside several research summaries on topics such as the Production of Scientific Ideas and the Impact of Superstar Scientists.

Main Points

1. Executive Compensation and Corporate Governance

• Common Perceptions:

  • CEOs are overpaid and their pay keeps increasing.
  • CEOs are not paid for performance.
  • Corporate boards are not doing their jobs.

• Two Measures of Pay:

  • Estimated Pay: Includes salary, bonus, restricted stock, and estimated option value. Reflects what the board awards.
  • Realized Pay: Includes salary, bonus, restricted stock, and actual option gains. Better measures what the CEO actually takes home.

• Trends in CEO Pay:

  • Average estimated CEO pay (adjusted for inflation) peaked in 2000 and has since declined by over 46% from 2000 to 2010.
  • In 2010, the average S&P 500 CEO received ~$10 million in estimated pay, which is ~200 times the median U.S. household income.
  • CEO pay relative to the top 0.1% of income earners has remained stable or declined over the long term, suggesting a market-driven rather than managerial power explanation.

• Performance and Pay:

  • Realized CEO pay is strongly correlated with firm stock performance.
  • CEOs in the top quintile of realized pay tend to lead top-performing firms.
  • CEO wealth is also strongly tied to firm performance, with the relationship strengthening after the mid-1980s.

• CEO Turnover:

  • CEO tenure has declined since the 1990s, with an average of 8 years in the 2000s compared to 10 years before 1998.
  • Turnover is increasingly linked to poor stock performance, indicating improved board monitoring.
  • The risk premium of CEO turnover is associated with higher pay, but turnover rates have also increased, offsetting some of the pay increases.

• Shareholder Views:

  • The Say-on-Pay votes mandated by the Dodd-Frank Act in 2010 showed strong support for current pay policies.
  • This suggests that shareholders do not perceive excessive pay or managerial power as the primary driver of CEO compensation.

• Corporate Performance:

  • Despite negative perceptions, U.S. public companies have weathered the financial crisis well.
  • Operating margins have increased, and profits as a share of GDP are at historically high levels.
  • This implies that corporate performance has improved, while CEO pay has declined, contradicting the idea that poor governance leads to poor performance.

2. Scientific Idea Production

• Role of Collaboration:

  • Scientific ideas are increasingly produced through collaboration, not individual genius.
  • Superstar scientists—key contributors to research—play a critical role in shaping scientific progress.

• Data and Analysis:

  • The study uses data on 12,000 elite life scientists and links them to 200,000 scientists in the U.S.
  • Data on papers, patents, and citations help trace the impact of knowledge and collaborative networks.

• Key Findings:

  • Collaboration with superstar scientists leads to longer productivity declines for their co-authors when the superstar leaves.
  • The decline is more pronounced for co-authors working on similar topics.
  • The impact is not due to gatekeeping or social connections, but rather the loss of an irreplaceable source of ideas.

• Implications:

  • The rate of innovation may be slowing due to increased specialization and collaboration.
  • The structure of scientific teams and networks significantly affect the pace of scientific progress.

Key Information

• Data Sources:

  • S&P ExecuComp database for CEO pay.
  • IRS tax return data for comparing public and private company executives.
  • National Income and Product Accounts for corporate performance.

• Research Implications:

  • CEO pay is influenced by market forces, firm size, and technological changes.
  • Corporate governance has improved in terms of monitoring and turnover.
  • The market for talent plays a central role in explaining CEO pay trends.

• Future Research:

  • The study explores the causal effects of collaboration using quasi-experimental data.
  • It investigates whether geographic proximity, intellectual ties, or social connections drive scientific interactions.

Conclusion

The lecture challenges the common belief that CEOs are overpaid and that corporate boards are ineffective. It highlights the market-driven nature of executive compensation and the role of performance in determining pay. Additionally, it shows that scientific innovation is increasingly collaborative, and that superstar scientists significantly influence the pace and direction of research. These findings contribute to a broader understanding of both corporate governance and scientific progress in the U.S. economy.