战略与国际研究中心-Iraq-and-the-Military-Balance-in-the-Gulf_59页_233kb

Summary of "Iraq and the Military Balance in the Gulf" (April 2001)

Core Content

This document provides an in-depth analysis of the military balance in the Gulf region, focusing on the status of military forces, expenditures, arms transfers, and the capabilities of individual Gulf states, particularly Iraq and Iran. It outlines the trends and challenges in military modernization, the impact of the Gulf War, and the limitations in the military capabilities of the region's countries.

Main Points

1. Military Balance Overview

• Iraq remains the most effective military power in the Gulf despite losing $40 - 60%$ of its operational inventory during the Gulf War.
• Iraq's ability to fund and maintain its military forces has declined significantly since 1994, with a lack of funds, spare parts, and production capabilities.
• Iraq has not been able to modernize its military structure to compensate for its reliance on arms imports, and about two-thirds of its remaining inventory is considered obsolete by Western standards.
• Iran suffered similar losses during the Iran-Iraq War (1988) but has since recovered and now possesses comparatively large military forces.
• Iran has not fully modernized its military capabilities, particularly in areas like airborne sensors, C4I/BM, and electronic warfare.
• No Southern Gulf state has significantly increased its ground forces since the Gulf War, except Saudi Arabia, which has developed a notable air force.
• There has been no progress in standardization and interoperability among Southern Gulf states, and their force improvements are heavily weapon-oriented with little real-world application of lessons from the Gulf War.

2. "Revolution in Military Affairs" (RMA) and Its Qualitative Advantages

• RMA emphasizes unity of command, combined operations, maneuver, deception, and strategic/tactical innovation.
• It promotes 24-hour warfare, including superior night, all-weather, and beyond-visual-range capabilities.
• Near real-time C4I/BM integration and space warfare are key aspects of RMA.
• RMA involves a new tempo of operations and sustainability, and includes precision-guided weapons, air-to-air combat, and deep strike capabilities.
• Realistic combat training and use of technology and simulation are essential components of RMA, with a focus on all-volunteer military and high entry standards.

3. Weaknesses in Western Power Projection Forces

• Western forces are not fully prepared for low-intensity conflicts, urban warfare, mountain/forested/jungle warfare, hostage-taking, and terrorism.
• They face challenges in collateral damage, sudden attacks, and extended deterrence.
• Ecological and environmental warfare and extended conflict and occupation warfare are also areas of concern.
• There are limitations in UN/cooperative/coalition warfare and weapons of mass destruction (WMD).
• Western forces may struggle to sustain large military efforts and maintain long-term presence.

4. General Conclusions

• The Gulf War did not result in a significant increase in arms imports, and the arms race in the Gulf is not as intense as commonly perceived.
• Iraq, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia faced major economic strains due to the Gulf War, while UAE partially offset these with increased oil revenues.
• Qatar and UAE were the only Gulf states that significantly increased arms imports after the Gulf War.
• The rate of arms deliveries to Iran and Saudi Arabia was higher than the rate of new agreements due to massive purchases in the late 1980s and early 1990s.
• The post-Gulf War arms sales trend is often confused with the earlier period's delivery rates.
• Iran has significantly reduced its military modernization efforts, and the Southern Gulf states are still awaiting major deliveries from their pre-Gulf War orders.

Key Information

1. Gulf Military Forces in 2001

2. Main Battle Tanks (MBTs) in 2001

3. Armored Fighting Vehicles (AFVs) in 2001

4. Gulf Military Expenditures: 1997-2001

5. Arms Transfers: 1996-1999

• The total arms imports for the Gulf states in this period were significantly lower than during the similar period of 1987-1990.
• Iraq saw a major reduction in arms imports after 1990 due to UN sanctions.
• Qatar and UAE were the only Gulf states that significantly increased arms imports post-Gulf War.
• The rate of arms deliveries to Iran and Saudi Arabia was higher than the rate of new agreements due to earlier purchases.

6. Major Suppliers

• Russia and China were the primary suppliers of arms to Gulf states.
• France and Germany also played a significant role in arms deliveries to the region.
• The United States was a major supplier to Saudi Arabia and UAE.

7. Military Manpower and Demographics

• Saudi Arabia has the largest active military manpower in the Gulf, followed by Iran.
• Iraq has a significant number of active military forces, but many are outdated.
• Yemen has the largest paramilitary forces in the region.
• Iran includes Revolutionary Guards in its military manpower.
• Saudi Arabia includes National Guard in its military manpower.
• Oman includes Royal Guard in its military manpower.
• The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) has not achieved significant integration of military forces.

8. Summary of Findings

• The Gulf War did not lead to a massive increase in arms imports.
• Iraq and Iran have been the primary military powers in the region.
• Iran has made significant progress in military modernization, but still has major deficiencies.
• Iraq has not been able to modernize its military, and its forces remain largely obsolete.
• Qatar and UAE have increased their military spending post-Gulf War.
• The GCC has not achieved significant integration of military forces.
• The "Revolution in Military Affairs" has not been fully implemented by the Gulf states.
• The Gulf states are not well-prepared for modern warfare, particularly in low-intensity conflicts and asymmetric warfare.
• The Gulf states have not been able to sustain large military efforts and maintain long-term presence.