EBA欧洲银行-EBA-Guideline-2015-22-Compliance-Table-GLs-on-sound-remuneration-policies_20页_428kb

Summary of EBA Guidelines Compliance Table

Core Content

This document provides an overview of the compliance status of competent authorities across the European Union with the EBA Guidelines on sound remuneration policies under Articles 74(3) and 75(2) of Directive 2013/36/EU and disclosures under Article 450 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 (CRR). The table lists the member states, their competent authorities, and whether they comply or intend to comply with the guidelines, along with relevant comments.

Main Viewpoints

• Compliance Status: Most competent authorities either comply or intend to comply with the guidelines, with a few exceptions.
• Discrepancies: Some authorities do not fully comply due to differences in national legislation and the interpretation of the proportionality principle.
• EBA and Commission Input: The EBA and European Commission have expressed support for allowing share-linked instruments for listed institutions, which is a point of contention for some national supervisors.
• National Implementation: Some countries have maintained their own interpretations and exemptions, which are not in line with the EBA guidelines, citing proportionality and administrative costs.

Key Information

Compliance Overview

Detailed Compliance Reasons

• Denmark: Does not comply with paragraph 251(a) of the guidelines regarding share-linked instruments. The Danish Financial Business Act is in line with the official translation of CRD IV, which restricts the use of share-linked instruments for listed institutions. The Danish authority also believes that the guidelines introduce new requirements that exceed the legal mandate.

• France (ACPR): Non-compliance with several paragraphs of the guidelines, including those on proportionality, scope of requirements, delegation of remuneration committees, deferral period, and retention period. The French legislator believes that the guidelines exceed the legal mandate and do not reflect the proportionality principle.

• Italy (Bdl): Partial non-compliance with the guidelines, specifically on the cap rule and long-term incentive plans. The Italian authority has opted to align with other member states and the upcoming CRD V.

• Luxembourg (CSSF): Does not comply with the restrictive interpretation of the proportionality principle. The CSSF continues to apply the principle as outlined in the CEBS Guidelines, which allows for neutralisation of certain requirements.

• Slovakia (NBS): Does not comply and does not intend to comply with the guidelines. The National Bank of Slovakia argues that remuneration is governed by national labor law and that the EBA guidelines are outside the scope of its competence and powers.

Conclusion

The compliance status of competent authorities with the EBA Guidelines on remuneration policies and disclosures is mixed, with several authorities expressing reservations due to national laws, the principle of proportionality, and the potential for administrative burden. The EBA and European Commission have suggested amendments to the CRD to allow for more flexibility, particularly regarding share-linked instruments and the scope of remuneration requirements.