【谢菲尔德大学】2024电力系统的信息物理建模与联合仿真技术报告_48页_19mb

Cyber-Physical Power System Modelling and Digital Co-Simulation Summary

Core Content

This document outlines the research conducted by Prof. Xin Zhang at the University of Sheffield, focusing on cyber-physical power system (CPPS) modelling and digital co-simulation. The research integrates physical power systems with cyber-communication and information systems, aiming to improve grid security, resilience, and operational efficiency in the context of digitalisation and net-zero energy transitions.

The document highlights the importance of co-simulation in accurately representing the interactions between power, communication, and information systems. It discusses modelling approaches, funding and industrial collaboration, and case studies on cyber-attacks and their impacts on microgrid control.

Main Research Areas

1. Sheffield Power System Research

• Research Focus: Cyber-physical power system co-simulation with thousands of nodes, covering transmission, distribution, and microgrid at micro- and milli-second time steps.
• Key Components:
  • Interface development between cyber and physical simulators
  • Monitoring and dispatch of cyber-physical grids
  • Cyber-physical vulnerability assessment and security dispatch
• Industrial Experience: Prof. Zhang has extensive experience with National Grid ESO in areas such as network security, constraint management, and energy balancing.
• Research Partnerships: The Control and Power Systems Laboratory has received over £5 million in research funding, with partnerships including National Grid, Siemens, Rolls-Royce, and others.
• Spin-off Companies: Includes Magtech and Magnomatics, showcasing strong industrial collaboration.

2. Cyber-Physical Power System Digital Co-Simulation

• Co-Simulation Architecture:
  • Option 1: Single simulator for both power and communication systems, using virtual links.
  • Option 2: Multiple simulators with synchronization, data exchange, and delay handling.
• Challenges:
  • Option 1 lacks support for comprehensive communication system functions.
  • Option 2 requires handling time synchronization, data exchange, and communication delays.
• Platform Features:
  • Integration of power system simulators (e.g., Opal-RT, Typhoon HIL)
  • Use of communication network simulators (e.g., EXata, OMNeT++)
  • Real-time data exchange between continuous-time power systems and discrete-event communication systems.

3. Cyber-Physical Power System Modelling

• Modelling of Cyber-Physical Power Network:
  • Integration of physical components (e.g., power electronics, generators) with cyber components (e.g., communication protocols, control strategies)
• Cyber-Physical Vulnerability Assessment:
  • Evaluation of security risks and attack detection in power systems
• Cyber-Physical Security Dispatch:
  • Integration of security analysis and dispatch strategies to enhance grid resilience

Key Technologies and Tools

• Digital Co-Simulation Platforms:
  • RT-LAB (Opal-RT)
  • Typhoon HIL
  • EXata (communication network simulator)
  • HIL SCADA Centre
• Control Systems:
  • Primary and Secondary Control for microgrids
  • Digital PWM signals and analog measurements
• Attack Detection:
  • Unknown Input Observer (UIO) with watermarking for detecting False Data Injection Attacks (FDIAs)
  • Recursive watermarking technique that embeds previous data to detect inconsistencies in real-time

Case Studies and Findings

1. Dropped Data Contingency

• Scenario: Data from secondary controllers is dropped due to communication issues.
• Impact: The dropped data is looped back to the power system simulator, affecting secondary control and load sharing.
• Observation: The system's ability to handle such contingencies is crucial for grid stability.

2. Network Latency & Re-Routing Strategy under DoS Attack

• Findings:
  • Zones with higher interconnectivity show lower network latency and greater resilience to DoS attacks.
  • Edge nodes in the grid may experience higher latency if re-routing is not efficient.
  • Regional control centres have the lowest latency in each zone.

3. False Data Injection Attacks (FDIAs)

• Types of Attacks:
  • P-FDIA: Affects both primary and secondary controllers, causing load sharing imbalance.
  • S-FDIA: Affects only secondary controllers, potentially leading to voltage violations and triggering protection mechanisms.
• Detection Method:
  • Watermarking embedded UIO improves attack detection while maintaining control performance.
  • The watermark strength is optimized to ensure minimal impact on control and maximum detection accuracy.

Research Contributions

• Modelling and Simulation:
  • Development of modular power converters, micro-controllers, and grid simulators for real-time testing.
• Security and Resilience:
  • Cyber-physical security dispatch and vulnerability assessment are key to ensuring grid resilience in the face of cyber-attacks.
• Innovation:
  • Recursive watermarking technique enhances attack detection and provides a robust framework for secure grid operations.

Funding and Collaborations

• UKRI Future Leaders Fellowship: £1,800,000 + £800,000 (4+3 years), project: Digitalisation of Electrical Power and Energy Systems Operation.
• EPSRC New Investigator Award: £500,000 (3 years), project: Grid flexibility through multiscale modelling.
• Industrial Partners:
  • National Grid
  • Siemens Gamesa Renewable Energy
  • Rolls-Royce
  • CRRC
  • Midea
  • Yokogawa
  • Chroma
  • Texas Instruments
• Research Centres:
  • Sheffield Siemens Gamesa Renewable Energy Research Centre (S²GRE)
  • Sheffield Midea Electrical Motors and Control Systems Research Centre
  • Rolls-Royce University Technology Centre
  • Centre for Research into Electrical Energy Storage & Applications (CREESA)

Conclusion

The research presented in this document focuses on the digital co-simulation of cyber-physical power systems, with an emphasis on security, resilience, and real-time operation. It highlights the importance of integration between physical and cyber components, funding and industrial collaboration, and advanced attack detection techniques. The work contributes to the digital transformation of power systems, especially in the context of net-zero energy transitions and increased renewable energy integration.