2016年-世界发展银行全球_Financial_Sector_Assessment_Program___Montenegro_Financial_Infrastructure_59页_790kb

Financial Sector Assessment Program - Montenegro: Payment and Settlement Systems Summary

I. Core Content

The Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP) conducted in Montenegro during September 2015 evaluated the country's payment and settlement systems. The assessment emphasized the importance of a robust and efficient financial infrastructure in supporting financial stability, economic development, and financial inclusion. It identified key areas for improvement, including legal clarity, risk mitigation, oversight mechanisms, and the integration of stakeholders in the payment system ecosystem.

II. Main Components of the Payment Infrastructure

Montenegro's payment and settlement infrastructure is composed of the following key elements:

• Central Bank of Montenegro (CBM) Payment System: This includes the RTGS (Real Time Gross Settlement) and DNS (Deferred Net Settlement) modules. The RTGS is the systemically important payment system in Montenegro, owned and operated by the CBM since 2005.
• Central Depository Agency (CDA): Acts as the Central Securities Depository (CSD) and Securities Settlement System (SSS), handling the clearing and settlement of government and corporate securities.

III. Key Payment Instruments

Montenegro uses a variety of payment instruments, including:

• Cash: The most popular retail payment mode.
• Credit and Debit Transfers: Used for both small and large-value transactions.
• Debit and Credit Cards: Widely used, with an interoperable ATM and PoS network.
• Internet and Mobile Banking: Offered by a few commercial banks, enabling e-commerce and inter-bank transactions.

IV. Legal and Regulatory Framework

The legal framework for payment and settlement systems in Montenegro includes:

• CBM Law: Grants the CBM authority to regulate, oversee, and license payment systems.
• Payment Systems Law (PS Law): Provides legal certainty for netting, finality, and insolvency protection. However, it lacks clarity on certain aspects such as netting, finality, and irrevocability in securities transactions.
• Securities Law: Defines dematerialization and immobilization but does not address netting and insolvency protection for securities transactions.

Recommendations:

• Clarify the negative scope of the PS Law to avoid ambiguity.
• Amend the Securities Law to provide a legal basis for netting, finality, and insolvency protection.
• Expand the scope of laws to include central counterparties and trade repositories in line with EU standards.

V. Risk Mitigation Measures

RTGS System

• Implement automated balance transfers between reserve requirement and settlement accounts.
• Automate intraday liquidity (IDL) process for banks.
• Streamline collateral lien and release workflows between CDA and CBM.
• Establish prudent valuation practices for collateral, with regular testing and independent validation.
• Document the gridlock resolution mechanism in the operating rules (OR).
• Analyze intraday liquidity flows and consider throughput guidelines.
• Eliminate the immediate rejection of low-priority transactions.

DNS System

• Revise operating rules to require banks to reserve balances for net clearing files.
• Ensure net clearing files are settled by extending automated IDL to participants with net debit positions.
• Conduct stress tests to determine the adequacy of guarantee funds in case of default.
• Monitor and report settlement failures in DvP 1 and DvP 2 models.

General Recommendations

• Develop a comprehensive Business Continuity Plan (BCP) for the CBM payment system, including Recovery Point Objective (RPO) and Recovery Time Objective (RTO).
• The BCP should be holistic, considering interdependencies with the MNSE and CBM.
• The trading platform of the MNSE should have backup arrangements.
• The FTP channel between MNSE and CDA should be encrypted.

VI. Oversight and Supervision

CBM Oversight

• The CBM Oversight Division has been established since 2011, but needs strengthening with trained personnel.
• The division should be independent from the payment systems department.
• The CBM should develop and publish an oversight policy aligned with the PS Law and PFMI.
• Implement electronic data collection for efficient off-site monitoring.
• Conduct on-site inspections in coordination with other departments to leverage resources like IT and audit.

SEC Oversight

• The Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) is responsible for licensing and oversight of securities market participants, including the CDA.
• The SEC should formally adopt the PFMI and publicly disclose them.
• Mandate the CDA to perform a self-assessment using the PFMI framework.
• Encourage the CDA to complete the Disclosure Framework and publicly disclose it.
• Train human resources in the SEC to conduct oversight under the PFMI framework.

VII. International Remittances

• Montenegro Transfers (MNE transfers) is the sole dedicated remittance service provider, licensed by the CBM under the PS Law.
• All remittances are paid in cash, even if beneficiaries have bank accounts.
• The CBM should encourage electronic crediting of remittance proceeds to promote financial inclusion.
• The CBM should obtain an expert legal opinion on the definition of remittances in the PS Law to clarify whether they can be credited to beneficiary accounts.

VIII. Government Payments and Receipts

• Government payments and receipts are processed through the CBM RTGS system.
• The CBM should establish a working group with the MoF, banks, Post Office, and Agency for Electronic Communication to promote electronic payment methods.
• The working group should explore the integration of the postal system into the payment infrastructure by enabling it to become a licensed entity or indirect participant.

IX. Data Collection and Analysis

• The CBM should collect detailed data on retail payment instruments, including:
  • Number and usage of credit and debit transfers.
  • Usage of cards at ATMs and PoS terminals.
  • Online transactions and card not present transactions.
  • Interchange fees, ATM and PoS downtime, and fraud statistics.
• The data should be analyzed to inform a comprehensive national strategy for financial inclusion.

X. Key Findings and Recommendations

• The legal framework is sound but needs clarity and expansion to align with international standards.
• The RTGS and DNS systems require risk mitigation measures to ensure liquidity and operational stability.
• Oversight and supervision of payment systems and securities infrastructure should be enhanced and standardized.
• Stakeholder cooperation is essential for the development and integration of payment systems.
• Data transparency and analysis are critical for policy-making and financial inclusion initiatives.

XI. Glossary

XII. Conclusion

The FSAP highlights the need for legal clarity, enhanced oversight, and improved risk management in Montenegro's payment and settlement systems. Strengthening these systems will contribute to financial stability, efficiency, and inclusion, aligning Montenegro with international standards and promoting economic growth.