战略与国际研究中心-Africa-Notes_-A-1988-Update-on-Soviet-Relations-with-Pretoria,-the-ANC,-and-the-SACP_8页_1mb

1988 Update on Soviet Relations with Pretoria, the ANC, and the SACP

Core Content

This document provides an analysis of the evolving Soviet stance toward South Africa during the late 1980s, focusing on the relationships between the Soviet Union, the African National Congress (ANC), and the South African Communist Party (SACP). It highlights the differences and similarities between Soviet academic and governmental positions, as well as the implications of these shifts for the political and economic future of post-apartheid South Africa.

Main Views and Key Information

Soviet Academic Perspectives

• Gleb Starushenko proposed a political solution to the South African conflict, advocating for a post-apartheid Parliament with two chambers and a focus on white minority rights.
• Victor Goncharov later distanced himself from Starushenko’s remarks, but both shared the view that negotiation, not armed struggle, should be the priority.
• Boris Asoyan criticized Soviet writings on Africa for being dogmatic and ideologically biased, and instead promoted a realistic and pragmatic approach.
• Vladimir Tikhomirov wrote a book on South African white politics with a Leninist approach, but it was heavily influenced by Starushenko’s speech, indicating a lack of fundamental difference in the views of the leading Soviet Africanists.

Governmental Stance

• The Soviet government, under Gorbachev, emphasized diplomatic flexibility and political solutions, while avoiding public commitments on specific issues like white minority rights.
• The Kremlin did not see the academic debates as a significant problem, and instead supported the idea of new ideas in South Africa policy.
• The Soviet Union was open to a multiparty political settlement, and was not opposed to the ANC and SACP as the main anti-apartheid actors, even as it sought to engage other organizations like the PAC.

ANC and SACP Shifts

• The ANC and SACP began to reconsider their stance on armed struggle, recognizing the need for a negotiated settlement.
• The ANC did not seek to be the "sole and authentic" representative of the South African people, and instead emphasized inclusive participation of all legitimate resistance groups.
• The ANC's draft constitution outlined a mixed economy, bill of rights, multiparty government, and equal rights for women, suggesting a pragmatic and inclusive approach to post-apartheid governance.

Economic and Political Outlook

• The Soviet Union and its Eastern Bloc allies were pragmatic about economic cooperation with South Africa, advocating for a mixed economy rather than broad nationalization.
• The Soviets acknowledged that economic factors would keep post-apartheid South Africa economically tied to the Western industrialized countries and Japan, and that ideology alone would not determine this.
• The Soviets were concerned about the economic and political risks of uncontrolled violence in South Africa, fearing it could destabilize the country and undermine their own economic position.

International Context

• The Soviets were open to dialogue with the West on arms control and economic cooperation, and were not opposed to a political solution in South Africa.
• The "sole and authentic" issue, which was a point of contention in the Namibia case, was not a central focus of the ANC’s strategy, and the Soviets did not push for it.
• There was no evidence that Soviet officials had strong disagreements with Starushenko’s views, suggesting that academic discussions reflected governmental thinking.

Divergence on Nuclear Policy

• A significant area of disagreement was South Africa’s membership in the IAEA. The Soviets did not support expelling South Africa, while the ANC sought to isolate South Africa economically and politically through nuclear sanctions.
• This drifting apart could lead to broader policy differences in the future, particularly regarding economic sanctions.

Conclusion

The Soviet Union, under Gorbachev, was open to a political solution in South Africa, emphasizing diplomatic engagement, economic pragmatism, and inclusive dialogue. While academic voices within the Soviet Union expressed more nuanced and flexible views, the government remained cautious about making public commitments. The ANC and SACP, although shifting their rhetoric, still maintained a strategic focus on negotiation and inclusive governance. The "sole and authentic" issue was not a central part of their strategy, and Soviet support for the ANC and SACP was not contingent on their exclusive representation. The nuclear issue remains a key point of contention, indicating that while there is convergence on many aspects of South African policy, ideological and strategic differences still persist.