战略与国际研究中心-PONARS-Policy-Memo-063_5页_140kb

Arms Control in the Context of Current US-Russian Relations

Core Content

This policy memo by Brian Taylor, published in June 1999 by PONARS, analyzes the state of US-Russian arms control relations in the aftermath of the Kosovo war and the broader geopolitical context of the early 2000s. It highlights the stagnation of the START II Treaty and the implications of this stalemate on future nuclear reductions and cooperation.

Main Points and Key Information

1. Current Impasse in Arms Control

• The START II Treaty has not been ratified by the Russian Duma, leading to a halt in START III negotiations.
• Both the US and Russia continue to maintain over 6,000 strategic nuclear warheads.
• The Kosovo war and upcoming elections in both countries have further delayed progress.
• The memo suggests that negotiated deep nuclear cuts may become a "science fiction" scenario by 2001 due to political and strategic obstacles.

2. Reasons for the Stalemate

• START II ratification is seen as a prerequisite for START III, but this dependency is questioned.
• The Duma's refusal to ratify START II is attributed to:
  • The political makeup of the Duma (communist and nationalist forces).
  • The treaty's terms requiring Russia to build up its forces to meet START II levels.
  • Russian elites' perception of US policies (e.g., NATO expansion, missile defense, Kosovo war) as security threats.
• The security dilemma is a key concept: actions taken by one state to enhance security can be perceived as threatening by another.

3. Why Russia Still Matters for Arms Control

• Russia's economic crisis limits its ability to match US and NATO military capabilities.
• Russian nuclear arsenal may decline to 1,000 warheads or less by 2010, but this is not certain.
• Tactical nuclear weapons remain a concern, as they are not bound by formal treaties.
• Non-proliferation is a critical issue: Russia's potential to leak fissile materials or other lethal technologies poses a serious threat to US national security.
• The Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program has been effective in curbing proliferation risks, but its future is uncertain due to legal hurdles.

4. Possible Solutions and Recommendations

• The US should consider dropping the requirement for START II ratification before START III negotiations.
• Mutually verifiable reciprocal reductions could be proposed to facilitate progress.
• Lifting the legislative mandate for maintaining START I force levels until START II is ratified could reduce US strategic nuclear force size and cost.
• Early warning cooperation is essential to reduce the risk of accidental nuclear war.
• Senate ratification of the CTBT would send a positive signal to Russia and reduce pressure for renewed nuclear testing.
• Increased legislative engagement between the US Congress and the Russian Duma/Federation Council could help sustain cooperation.
• CTR program must remain adequately funded and operational to support non-proliferation efforts.

Conclusion

Despite the deteriorating bilateral relations and the political distractions of upcoming elections, the US and Russia share a fundamental interest in reducing nuclear dangers and preventing the proliferation of nuclear and other lethal technologies. Cooperation, particularly in areas like early warning, missile defense, and non-proliferation, remains crucial. The memo emphasizes that working with Russia is necessary to address the most pressing security concerns, including the management of Russia's nuclear legacy.

Summary Table

Key Quotes

• "The war in Kosovo may be the final nail in the coffin for the sputtering US-Russian bilateral arms control process."
• "It would be a mistake to write Russia off entirely, either as too weak or as a lost cause."
• "The security dilemma is the reason why Russian elites perceive US actions as threatening."
• "The Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program has been the most successful in US-Russian nuclear cooperation."