国防关键供应链工作组发布最终报告（英）-24页_359kb

Defense Critical Supply Chain Task Force Final Report Summary

Core Content

The Defense Critical Supply Chain Task Force (DCTF), established by the House Armed Services Committee, conducted a comprehensive study on the vulnerabilities and risks of the U.S. defense supply chain over a three-month period. The report outlines six legislative recommendations aimed at improving supply chain resilience, risk management, and strategic preparedness for the Fiscal Year 2022 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA).

The Task Force, composed of four Democrats and four Republicans, was formed in response to the global supply chain disruptions caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, which highlighted the strategic and economic risks of overreliance on foreign suppliers, especially China. The report emphasizes the need for greater transparency, diversification, and collaboration with industry and allies to secure the Defense Industrial Base (DIB).

Main Views and Key Information

Strategic Importance of Supply Chains

• Supply chains are critical to national security and economic stability.
• The pandemic exposed how foreign adversaries can exploit supply chain vulnerabilities to disrupt U.S. operations.
• The U.S. has become overly dependent on China for key defense-related goods, including semiconductors, Rare Earth Elements (REEs), energetic materials, and pharmaceutical ingredients.

Legislative Recommendations

• The report includes six legislative amendments for the FY2022 NDAA.
• These recommendations are actionable, not comprehensive, and aim to seize the initiative in securing defense supply chains.

Key Supply Chain Vulnerabilities

1. Semiconductors and critical electronic components:

   • DOD uses structured strategic analysis.
   • Limited domestic manufacturing capacity and centralization in Asia-Pacific pose significant risks.
   • DOD relies on external experts for data due to its small market presence.

2. Rare Earth Elements (REEs):

   • DOD is required to conduct biennial assessments under the Strategic and Critical Materials Stock Piling Act.
   • REEs are essential for military and civilian use, and their disruption would impact both.
   • The essential civilian economy is most vulnerable to REE shortages.

3. Energetic materials (propellants, explosives, and supporting chemicals):

   • DOD uses Fragility and Criticality (FaC) assessments to prioritize vulnerabilities.
   • High-priority items include those sourced from foreign adversaries, fragile suppliers, or sole sources.
   • Mitigation strategies include specification updates, alternative sourcing, and policy reform.

4. Active pharmaceutical ingredients (APIs) and therapeutics:

   • DOD sources pharmaceuticals through the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA).
   • The Trade Agreements Act (TAA) restricts DOD's ability to source from certain countries.
   • The Stoplight Report was developed during the pandemic to track pharmaceutical availability and guide resource allocation.

Workforce Considerations

• A skilled workforce is essential for supply chain resilience and domestic manufacturing.
• DOD considers workforce trends when analyzing supply chain risks.
• Foreign adversaries use workforce as a tool for economic warfare, and allies may be deterred by U.S. "Buy America" policies.

Task Force Activities

• Conducted 12 formal meetings and 9 roundtables with DOD officials, industry leaders, think tanks, and academia.
• Focused on three main areas:
  1. DOD's processes for analyzing and mitigating supply chain risks.
  2. Prioritization of vulnerabilities for the four critical supplies.
  3. Steps Congress and others can take to enhance supply chain resilience.

Key Recommendations

• Enhance supply chain visibility through data aggregation and secure cloud environments.
• Invest in domestic manufacturing and on-shoring strategies for critical defense items.
• Promote collaboration with allies to reduce sole-source dependencies and build shared capabilities.
• Develop a national microelectronics strategy and Technology Competitiveness Council.
• Support workforce development and digital engineering to ensure sustainable and secure production.
• Implement a whole-of-government approach to coordinate supply chain risk management and strategic planning.

Conclusion

The DCTF underscores the urgent need for legislative action to secure the U.S. defense supply chain. The Task Force's work has demonstrated the importance of transparency, resilience, and strategic foresight in addressing current and future supply chain risks. The final report is a call to action for the U.S. government, industry, and allied nations to collaborate and act decisively to mitigate vulnerabilities and strengthen national security.