公民社会研究所-新冠病毒防控失败的帽子戏法（英文）-2020.5-74页_2mb

CIViTAS Summary: A Hat Trick of Failures

Core Content

This report, A Hat Trick of Failures: How 'the Blob' Led the British Government Down the Wrong Path, critically examines the UK government's response to the COVID-19 pandemic. It argues that the response was marked by a series of failures, including an over-reliance on scientific advice, poor economic and social planning, and a lack of political leadership. The authors highlight how the government's deference to 'the science' led to decisions that were not well-considered and had significant negative consequences.

Main Points

1. The UK's Pandemic Response: A Triple Failure

• The UK has one of the highest excess death rates per capita globally in the first half of 2020.
• It has one of the most expensive pandemic responses among OECD countries, both in terms of direct costs and economic damage.
• It is among the least prepared countries to relax lockdown measures, with only three countries (Algeria, Nicaragua, and Iran) being less prepared.

2. The Role of 'The Blob'

• 'The Blob' refers to a scientific clique within the UK's managerialist Whitehall culture that the government did not question or challenge.
• The government's shift from public health campaigns to lockdown was influenced by this group, which had a 'representational monopoly' on scientific advice.
• The reliance on SAGE and other scientific advisory groups led to decisions that ignored broader economic, social, and political considerations.

3. Ministerial Deference and the Loss of Political Leadership

• UK ministers showed a strong deference to scientific advice, often framing their decisions as being guided by 'the science'.
• This created a situation where ministers were not making the final decisions, but rather passing them to scientific committees.
• The report argues that this approach risks eroding public trust in scientific expertise and undermines the political responsibility of ministers.

4. Epidemiological Models and Policy Decisions

• The government was heavily influenced by a single epidemiological model from Imperial College London, which predicted a catastrophic scenario.
• This model assumed a binary choice between eradication and endemicity, which may not have been appropriate for the UK's situation.
• The report questions whether the government could have pursued a more balanced approach by protecting the most vulnerable while allowing less restrictive measures for others.

5. Whitehall Managerialism

• The UK civil service has increasingly adopted a managerialist approach over the past three decades, emphasizing performance indicators and target-setting.
• This culture has led to a situation where scientific advisors, rather than ministers, are seen as the primary decision-makers.
• The Civil Contingencies Secretariat (CCS) and Cabinet Office Briefing Rooms (COBR) have played a central role in this process, often deferring to sub-committees rather than making comprehensive plans.

6. Policy Errors and Consequences

• The government's early response included discharging elderly patients from hospitals to care homes, which may have contributed to the spread of the virus in care homes.
• There was a failure to provide adequate PPE to NHS and social care workers.
• The government ignored the potential of social distancing and hand washing to reduce infections, which had already begun to decline in early March.
• The UK abandoned its contact-tracing app after significant investment, despite warnings that it would not be effective.

Key Recommendations

• Broaden the pool of expertise consulted by the government, including philosophers, historians, and legal experts, to better balance scientific and non-scientific considerations.
• Re-evaluate the structure and purpose of scientific advisory groups to ensure they do not have a monopoly on decision-making.
• Establish clearer boundaries between ministers and scientific committees to ensure political accountability is maintained.
• Dismantle the network of advisory bodies that operate without ministerial oversight.
• Improve the scrutiny and debate of scientific evidence passed between groups to prevent over-reliance on a narrow set of models.
• Encourage ministers to take a stronger role in decision-making during future public health crises.
• Investigate why other European countries like Germany, Sweden, and the Netherlands managed the pandemic more effectively in terms of death rates, economic impact, and lockdown duration.

Conclusion

The report argues that the UK government's response to the pandemic was flawed due to an over-reliance on scientific advice and a lack of political leadership. It calls for a cultural shift in government to ensure that ministers are not merely passive recipients of scientific advice, but active decision-makers who consider the broader implications of their policies.

Appendix and Notes

• The report includes an Appendix on excess mortality by country, highlighting the UK's poor performance.
• It also provides Notes that reference data sources and clarify the methodology used in the analysis.

Summary of Key Figures

• Excess mortality: UK had one of the highest rates globally.
• Lockdown impact: Over 25,000 elderly patients were returned to care homes, leading to over 16,000 deaths.
• Economic cost: The UK's response was one of the most expensive in the OECD.
• Scientific advisory groups: SAGE, NERVTAG, and SPI-M had a 'representational monopoly' on advice.
• COBR: A central mechanism for emergency planning that defers decisions to sub-committees.

Critical Observations

• The report emphasizes that 'the science' is not a monolithic entity but a dynamic and evolving field.
• It highlights the importance of political judgment in public health decisions, which was often sidelined.
• The lack of ministerial control over the emergency response led to a loss of coherence in government policy.
• The managerialist culture in Whitehall contributed to a top-down, reactive approach to the crisis, which may have exacerbated its impact.

Final Statement

The authors conclude that while no minister acted with bad intent, the structure of government and the culture of scientific advisory systems played a significant role in the UK's poor pandemic response. They argue that a change in culture is required to ensure that future responses are more balanced, politically informed, and economically viable.