德国外交关系理事会-疫情之后的德国债务危机和欧洲财政立场(英文)-2021.2-12页_291kb
报告摘要
Summary of DGAP Policy Brief: Germany's Debt Brake and Europe's Fiscal Stance after COVID-19
Core Content
This policy brief analyzes the implications of Germany's return to its debt brake (Schuldenbremse) in the context of post-pandemic fiscal policy in Europe. It argues that a premature reimplementation of the debt brake could stifle economic recovery and undermine transatlantic cooperation, especially as the United States is pursuing a more expansive fiscal policy. The brief proposes several options to mitigate the fiscal drag and calls for a broader political debate on reforming the debt brake and the broader European fiscal framework.
Main Points
1. Risk of Premature Fiscal Tightening
- Germany's plan to return to the debt brake in 2022 would lead to a sharp fiscal consolidation, reducing the structural deficit by around 2% of GDP.
- This would result in a negative fiscal impulse for the euro area of 0.6% of GDP, significantly impacting recovery.
- The return to the debt brake is a political decision, likely influenced by the ruling coalition ahead of the 2021 general elections.
2. Current Fiscal Stance and Global Context
- The United States is implementing a large-scale fiscal stimulus (up to $1.9 trillion), creating a fiscal divide between Europe and the US.
- A tighter fiscal stance in Europe would hinder global recovery and weaken transatlantic economic ties.
- Germany's fiscal policy has historically contributed to external imbalances, as seen after the Great Financial Crisis.
3. Fiscal Framework and Flexibility
- The debt brake is more flexible than commonly perceived, with components that allow for adjustments based on economic conditions.
- The debt brake includes a structural component (maximum deficit of 0.35% of GDP), a cyclical component (based on the output gap), and a financial transactions component.
- The formula for the cyclical component can be modified without constitutional change, offering room for more fiscal space.
4. Impact on Municipalities
- The debt brake indirectly affects Kommunen (municipalities) by limiting the ability of Länder to support them.
- Many municipalities were already highly indebted before the crisis, and recent transfers have been necessary to prevent further fiscal strain.
- A broader municipal debt relief plan could be beneficial, following the example of Hesse in 2019.
Key Recommendations
1. Extending the State Contingent Suspension
- The escape clause of the debt brake can be extended as long as necessary to support economic recovery.
- This would help maintain demand support and provide forward guidance, potentially encouraging similar suspensions at the Länder level.
2. Gradual Reintroduction of the Rules
- A transition period for reintroducing the statutory limit could help ease the return to fiscal discipline.
- The German Council of Economic Experts proposed a maximum permissible structural borrowing component of 1.75–2.25% of GDP in 2022, aiming for a return to 0.35% by 2026 rather than 2024.
3. Frontloading the Use of Special Fund Reserves
- The federal government has accumulated reserves in special funds (e.g., asylum, energy, and defense-related funds) totaling €54.9 billion.
- Frontloading these reserves could provide a buffer of up to 1.5% of GDP, reducing the contractionary impact of returning to the debt brake.
4. Modifying the Cyclicality of the Rule
- The cyclical component of the debt brake can be adjusted by modifying the "budget sensitivity" parameter or the output gap calculation.
- These changes could increase fiscal flexibility during downturns and reduce procyclical bias.
5. Extending Repayment Periods
- The current repayment schedule for excess borrowing reduces future fiscal flexibility.
- Extending repayment periods and making them countercyclical (e.g., tied to economic performance) could help avoid a fiscal cliff and support recovery.
Conclusion
- The debt brake's rigid structure may not be well-suited to the post-pandemic economic environment.
- Reforms are necessary to address the limitations of the current fiscal framework and to ensure a more resilient and flexible approach to fiscal policy in Germany and Europe.
- Constitutional amendments may be required, but there is a precedent for such changes, and political consensus exists to pursue them.
Key Information
- Estimated Net Borrowing for 2020 and 2021: €199 billion and €114 billion respectively.
- Planned 2022 Net Borrowing Under Debt Brake: €24 billion.
- Total Extraordinary Borrowing by Länder: Around €130.4 billion.
- Repayment Periods for Länder: Range from 4 to 50 years, with some extending beyond 2050.
- Potential Impact of Fiscal Tightening: A contractionary fiscal impulse of 0.6% of GDP for the euro area.
- Fiscal Drag Risk: A return to the debt brake could significantly stifle recovery and undermine global coordination.
Tables Summary
Table 1: Budgetary Projections (in billion EUR)
| Year | General Government Budget Balance | Central Government | Federal State Governments | Local Governments | Social Security Funds |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2019 | 52.5 | 22.7 | 16 | 5.1 | 8.7 |
| 2020 | -166 | -105 | -23.5 | 1.5 | -39.5 |
| 2021 | -247 | -194 | -23 | -6.5 | -24 |
| 2022 | -74 | -38 | -15 | -7.5 | -13.5 |
| 2023 | -29 | -12 | -5.5 | -6 | -5.5 |
| 2024 | -8 | -1.5 | -3.5 | -6.5 | 3.5 |
Table 2: Land-Specific Borrowing and Repayment Schedules
| Land | Government Coalition | Amount (Billions EUR) | % of 2019 GDP | Repayment Period |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Baden-Württemberg | Greens/CDU | 7,200 | 1.37% | 2024–2049 |
| Bavaria | CSU/Free Voters | 40,000 | 6.32% | 2024–2044 |
| Berlin | SPD/The Left/Greens | 7,300 | 4.76% | 2023–2050 |
| Brandenburg | SPD/CDU/Greens | 2,200 | 2.96% | 2022–2052 |
| Bremen | SPD/Greens/The Left | 1,200 | 3.57% | 2024–2054 |
| Hamburg | SPD/Greens | 6,000 | 4.87% | 2025–2045 |
| Hesse | CDU/Greens | 12,000 | 4.10% | 2021–2050 |
| Lower Saxony | SPD/CDU | 7,800 | 2.50% | 2024–2049 |
| Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania | SPD/CDU | 2,850 | 6.12% | 2025–2044 |
| North Rhine-Westphalia | CDU/FDP | 25,000 | 3.50% | 2020–2070 |
| Rheinland-Pfalz | SPD/FDP/Greens | 3,500 | 2.40% | 2024–2049 |
| Saarland | CDU/SPD | 2,071 | 1.91% | 2020–2050 |
| Saxony | CDU/Greens/SPD | 6,000 | 4.70% | 2021–2029 |
| Saxony-Anhalt | CDU/SPD/Greens | 258 | 0.41% | 2020–2024 |
| Schleswig-Holstein | CDU/Greens/FDP | 5,500 | 5.63% | 2024–2064 |
| Thuringia | Minority government by The Left/SPD/Greens | 1,560 | 2.44% | 2022–2029 |
Final Thoughts
- The debt brake, while a symbol of fiscal discipline, may not be appropriate for the current economic climate.
- Reforms are essential to address the limitations of the current framework and to support a more coordinated and effective fiscal response to the pandemic.
- A political debate on the reform of the debt brake and the broader European fiscal stance is necessary to ensure long-term economic stability and cooperation.
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