2001年-世界发展银行全球_Bangladesh___The_Experience_and_Perceptions_of_Public_Officials_72页_3mb

Summary of Bangladesh: The Experience and Perceptions of Public Officials

Core Content

This document, Bangladesh: The Experience and Perceptions of Public Officials, is a World Bank Technical Paper that analyzes the performance and perceptions of public officials in Bangladesh. It aims to provide insights into the institutional environment of the public sector and its impact on efficiency, accountability, and corruption. The study is based on survey data collected from public officials in 1999 as part of the Bank-Netherlands Partnership Program (BNPP), and it seeks to inform future reform strategies.

Main Points

1. Public Employment in Bangladesh

• Government Structure: Bangladesh has a parliamentary system with the Prime Minister as the chief executive and the President as the head of state.
• Administrative Units: The executive branch includes ministries, departments, directorates, and local governments (municipal corporations, district councils, thana committees).
• Employment Growth: Since 1972, the number of ministries increased from 21 to 35 by 1994. Public sector employment grew at an annual rate of 3.6% from 1972 to 1992, reaching nearly 1 million, and has remained relatively stable since.
• Employment Proportion: Government employment constitutes 1.8% of the total labor force in Bangladesh, lower than most South Asian countries.
• Salary Trends: Public sector salaries are generally low, with a significant real wage decline since 1971. The salary compression ratio between the highest and lowest levels has decreased sharply, from 46 in 1962 to 10 in 1997.
• Performance Metrics: Bangladesh's bureaucratic efficiency is rated at 4.7 (out of 10), lower than South Asian averages. Public sector performance is generally poor in comparison to the region, with lower levels of GNP per capita, tax revenue as a percentage of GDP, and higher systems losses in utilities.

2. Survey of Officials

• Purpose: The survey aimed to identify weaknesses in the public sector and understand the institutional factors that influence performance.
• Funding: Part of the BNPP, which supported 16 country studies, including Bangladesh.
• Methodology: The survey was designed based on focus group interviews with senior officials and used a tested template. It included questions on recruitment, transfers, incentives, and perceptions of corruption.
• Sample Characteristics: The survey included officials from various levels (Class I to Class IV) and different types of organizations, such as ministries, autonomous bodies, and local governments.
• Key Findings:
  • Officials expressed concerns over patronage appointments and political interference.
  • Corruption and lack of budget predictability were identified as major obstacles to performance.
  • Non-salary income sources, such as unofficial payments, were common and influenced behavior.

3. Survey Findings

• Corruption Perceptions: A significant portion of households reported using unofficial methods to access public services, indicating widespread corruption in the system.
• Budget Issues: Promised and received budget allocations often did not match, leading to inefficiencies and lack of resources.
• Incentives and Rewards: Officials felt that merit-based recruitment was not always practiced, and that transfers were sometimes used as a form of punishment.
• Performance Pay-offs: The study found that reducing political interference, improving budget predictability, and promoting merit-based recruitment could lead to better accountability and performance.

Key Information

Institutional Environment and Performance

• Institutional Impact: The institutional environment significantly affects public sector performance. The study used a model to test how different aspects of this environment correlate with accountability and corruption.
• Institutional Differences: Different organizations have varying institutional environments, and some are more effective than others. For example, the Bangladesh Water Development Board (BWDB) and Local Government Engineering Department (LGED) were highlighted as potentially more effective.
• Empirical Analysis: The survey data was used to test common assertions about the civil service, such as the lack of promotion based on performance and the perception that public officials do not want to move to the private sector.

Reform Recommendations

• Reducing Political Interference: Officials believe that reducing interference from politicians can improve performance and reduce corruption.
• Improving Budget Predictability: Ensuring that budget allocations are reliable and consistent is crucial for effective service delivery.
• Merit-Based Recruitment: Promoting merit-based recruitment for higher-level positions (Class I) can enhance accountability and performance.
• Addressing Incentives: Informal incentives, such as bribes, need to be addressed to create a fair and effective public sector.

Conclusion

The survey provides valuable insights into the challenges and opportunities for reform in Bangladesh's public sector. It emphasizes that understanding the institutional environment and its influence on behavior is essential for improving performance and reducing corruption. The findings suggest that reforms targeting political interference, budget predictability, and merit-based recruitment are likely to yield the most significant improvements in the public sector's effectiveness.

References

• The study is part of the World Bank's Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Network.
• Survey data was collected by a team led by Professor Muzaffar Ahmed of Dhaka University.
• The report was peer-reviewed and includes contributions from several experts and partners.
• The findings are based on both official data and responses from public officials.