2015年-世界发展银行全球_Mali_Financial_Sector_Assessment_Program___The_Microfinance_Sector_22页_1mb

Summary of the Financial Sector Assessment Program - Development Module in Mali

Core Content

The microfinance sector in Mali has been severely affected by a crisis that has persisted for over six years, leading to the closure of two major institutions and the technical bankruptcy of several others. Despite its importance in providing financial services to underserved populations, the sector has faced significant challenges in terms of governance, regulatory oversight, and financial sustainability. The crisis has resulted in a loss of confidence among depositors and a decline in the sector's profitability and asset base.

Main Viewpoints

• Sector Overview:
  The microfinance sector in Mali has around 1 million members, primarily in rural areas. It reaches a similar number of individuals as the banking sector, though it is not systemically important.

  • Clients: Approximately 937,815 clients, with mutual organizations accounting for the majority (62.5%).
  • Financial Services: The sector offers a range of services including savings, credit, and insurance, with a focus on agricultural and small business needs.

• Crisis Typology:
  The crisis is categorized into three groups:

  1. Active MFIs: 33 institutions that are operating but face financial and operational challenges.
  2. Major Bankrupted MFIs: Two major institutions (Union Kondo Jigima and Union Jéméni) that have ceased operations, with total deposits estimated at 8.9 billion CFA francs.
  3. Rest of the Sector: Includes smaller, structurally weak MFIs and those that have never started operations.

• Financial Indicators:
  The sector has experienced a sharp decline in profitability and assets. From 2010 to 2013, the net results before subsidy dropped by 260.3%, and total assets declined by 24.7%.

  • Non-performing loans (NPL): Peaked at 11.8% in 2012 and remained high at 9.2% in 2013.
  • Refinancing: Declined by 38.2% due to the crisis, impacting the sustainability of MFIs.

• Legal and Regulatory Framework:
  The previous regulatory framework (1993) was too lax, leading to rapid expansion of the sector without adequate oversight.

  • New WAEMU Law (2010): Introduced stricter prudential requirements, including solvency ratios, liquidity ratios, and reporting standards.
  • Supervision: The national supervisory body (CCS/SFD) and the Banking Commission (CB-UMOA) are responsible for monitoring MFIs. However, the implementation of the new framework has been slow and inconsistent.

Key Information

• Regulatory Changes:

  • The new law introduced a single licensing regime for all MFIs, including cooperatives, associations, and limited liability companies.
  • It established prudential ratios and reporting requirements aligned with banking standards.
  • The BCEAO now has a role in approving new licenses and recommending revocations.

• Supervision Challenges:

  • The national supervisory body (CCS/SFD) has limited resources and capacity.
  • From 2010 to 2014, only around 20 supervision missions were conducted annually, with limited follow-up.
  • The introduction of risk-based supervision in recent years aims to improve targeting and early detection of issues.

• Impact of the Crisis:

  • Loss of Confidence: A complete loss of trust in the sector has affected even the remaining viable institutions.
  • Deposit Losses: A large number of low-income depositors have lost their savings.
  • Financial Inclusion: The crisis has significantly hindered financial inclusion, particularly in rural areas where microfinance institutions traditionally operate.

• Emergency Plan:

  • Adopted in March 2015, the National Emergency Plan for Microfinance aims to clean up the sector through restructuring, liquidation, and depositors' indemnification.
  • It outlines a series of actions, including the consolidation of active MFIs, the implementation of a deposit guarantee mechanism, and the strengthening of the national supervisory body.
  • The plan is considered a key milestone, but its implementation is complicated by fiscal constraints and donor reluctance.

• Remaining Challenges:

  • Data Quality: The lack of reliable and timely data remains a major obstacle for effective supervision and decision-making.
  • Implementation Gaps: Despite the new legal framework, many MFIs have not fully complied with the new prudential and reporting requirements.
  • Funding Issues: The absence of a deposit guarantee fund has delayed the liquidation of distressed institutions.

Recommendations

• Strengthen the National Supervisory Body: Enhance its capacity, resources, and independence to ensure effective oversight.
• Implement the Emergency Plan: Proceed with the restructuring, liquidation, and indemnification of distressed institutions.
• Improve Data Collection and Reporting: Develop a standardized system for data entry and reporting to ensure transparency and accuracy.
• Promote Financial Inclusion: Expand microfinance services to reach more underserved populations, particularly in rural areas.
• Enhance Governance and Risk Management: Improve the governance structures and risk management practices of MFIs to prevent future crises.

Conclusion

The microfinance sector in Mali has been severely impacted by a prolonged crisis, primarily due to weak regulatory and supervisory frameworks. While the new legal and supervisory regime provides a foundation for recovery, its implementation has been slow and inconsistent. The National Emergency Plan is a critical step toward restoring confidence and stability, but its success depends on the Government of Mali's commitment and the ability to overcome fiscal and political challenges.