兰德-Main-Command-Post_124页_2mb

Summary of Main Command Post-Operational Detachments (MCP-ODs) and Division Headquarters Readiness

Core Content

This report, commissioned by the U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM), evaluates the impact of the Focus Area Review Group II (FARG II) redesign on the readiness of division headquarters (HQs) to rapidly respond to contingencies and conduct mission command from alert through completed deployment in theater. The redesign introduced the Main Command Post-Operational Detachment (MCP-OD), a new unit type that allows reserve component (RC) personnel to augment active component (AC) division and corps staffs. The study also explores potential mitigation strategies for the challenges posed by this multicomponent approach.

Main Findings

• MCP-OD Readiness: MCP-ODs have shown they can successfully deploy with AC division HQs if given at least 270 days of advance notice. However, without sufficient advance notice, RC personnel may not be able to deploy as quickly as AC soldiers.

• Risk Acceptance: The FARG II design was developed with an understanding of the risks associated with RC personnel availability, including their limited mobilization time and fewer deployment opportunities compared to AC soldiers. These risks were explicitly acknowledged and accepted by the Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA).

• Modeling Results: The model developed in the study indicates that the new structure can meet a range of rotational and small-scale contingency requirements. However, in the worst-case scenario of a full HQ deployment on less than 90 days' notice, a shortfall of approximately 24 RC personnel is expected. This could be mitigated through a temporary "bridge" of 24 AC personnel from outside the HQ.

• Operational Impact: The study highlights that the FARG II model is not a perfect solution, and there are implications of MCP-OD readiness limitations that require further attention and mitigation.

Key Questions Addressed

• Are there significant risks with FARG II that were not identified during the design process and thus unknowingly accepted by Army leadership?
• What additional steps might be taken to further mitigate both anticipated and unanticipated risks?

Methodology

The study employed a multi-faceted approach:

• Literature Review: Examined U.S. Army doctrine, historical deployments, and force structure documents to understand the context and expectations for division HQ operations.
• Interviews: Conducted with approximately 90 subject-matter experts, including AC and RC personnel, to gather insights on the practical implications of the FARG II redesign.
• Modeling: Developed a staffing model to simulate different deployment scenarios and assess the readiness of division HQs under varying conditions.

Recommendations

1. Division Structure and Manning

   • Consider two division designs: one fully manned by the AC and another with an MCP-OD, accepting the associated risks.
   • Reconsider the designation of division HQs as true multicomponent units (MCUs) and integrate MCP-ODs accordingly.
   • Document MCP-OD civil affairs (CA) and military information support operations (MISO) requirements in a distinct cell within USACAPOC.
   • Explore split stationing options for MCP-ODs to better align soldiers for career progression and training opportunities.
   • If MCP-ODs consistently struggle with personnel, convert them to true MCUs and assign USAR soldiers based on core competencies.
   • Develop contingency staffing plans for divisions to address potential shortfalls not sufficiently mitigated by MCP-ODs.

2. Doctrine and Guidance

   • FORSCOM should consider issuing an information paper on Army decisionmaking and HQ force structure trade-offs.
   • Include division HQ design in intermediate-level professional military education courses.
   • Update TOE and MTOE narratives to more explicitly address FARG II design risks and the relationship between division HQ and MCP-OD.

3. MCP-OD Training and Resourcing

   • Designate one or more MCP-ODs as Focused Readiness Units to enable deployment within 60 days.
   • Collaborate between AC divisions and MCP-OD commanders to plan, execute, and validate training.
   • Identify and document shortfalls based on current RC resourcing levels.
   • Plan for postmobilization training to close identified shortfalls.
   • Synchronize AC and RC training management cycles to optimize MCP-OD readiness and integration.
   • Implement a weekend training program for AC soldiers to align with MCP-OD inactive duty training.

Conclusion

The FARG II redesign presents both opportunities and challenges for division HQ readiness. While the model has demonstrated its ability to support a range of missions, there are still risks that require attention. The recommendations aim to improve the likelihood of success and reduce the risk of shortfalls during deployments. The study emphasizes the need for continued refinement of the design, training, and resource allocation strategies to ensure the effectiveness of multicomponent units in future operations.