战略与国际研究中心-Cuba-Outlook_17页_3mb

Cuba Outlook: Raúl and Beyond Summary

Core Content

This report, authored by Peter DeShazo and published by the CSIS Americas Program in September 2009, provides an in-depth analysis of Cuba's political, economic, and social landscape under Raul Castro's leadership. It also explores the implications of Cuba's future for U.S. policy and international relations.

Main Points

Raul Castro in Power

• Raul Castro assumed control of the Cuban government in 2006 following Fidel's illness, but Fidel's continued influence remains a challenge.
• Raul's government is characterized by continuity rather than change, with a gerontocratic leadership structure and strong support from the Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR).
• Raul is focused on economic stability and social order, avoiding significant political reforms.
• The Communist Party still holds a dominant role, with Fidel as its first secretary, and Raul's leadership is seen as incomplete without Fidel's removal.
• Raul is likely to step down in 2013, and his administration is prepared to maintain control through institutional strength and repression.

The Cuban Economy

• Cuba's economy has been tumultuous since the end of Soviet subsidies, leading to a downturn and declining living standards.
• Key economic sectors include tourism, medical services, biotechnology, and energy, with Venezuela and China becoming major trade partners.
• Venezuela provides significant oil imports and financial aid, while China offers investment and trade.
• Agriculture remains a major weakness, with low food production and reliance on imported food.
• Economic liberalization is minimal, with limited private employment, high taxes, and restricted credit.
• The dual currency system (Cuban peso and convertible peso) hinders reform, and state control over the economy is still strong.

The Armed Forces

• The FAR is the central institution of the Cuban state and a key pillar of Raul's regime.
• Despite a 70-75% budget cut after the end of Soviet subsidies, the FAR maintains high prestige and social mobility.
• The FAR controls 60% of the economy, including tourism and dollarized sectors, and has a professional and disciplined structure.
• Younger officers in the FAR have economic experience and may lead the institution toward a less ideological approach.
• The FAR is interested in cooperation with the U.S., particularly in military and security matters.

Cuban Society

• Cuban society is fragmented, with low trust in the state and high levels of apathy.
• Youth are more dissatisfied and disillusioned with the regime, with many seeking to migrate or engage in illegal economic activities.
• Civil society is weak and lacks credible leadership or mass mobilization potential.
• Religious and cultural groups have gained more prominence, offering spiritual and social support but not political mobilization.
• Racial and regional disparities persist, with the white minority holding most leadership positions and remittances favoring European-Cuban families.

Foreign Policy

• Cuba's foreign policy has shifted from ideological to pragmatic, especially under Raul.
• Latin America and Brazil are now central to Cuba's foreign relations, with Venezuela being a key strategic partner.
• Medical diplomacy and soft power have been successful in the Americas, particularly in the Caribbean.
• Relations with the U.S. remain tense due to the embargo, which the regime uses to justify repression.
• There is hope among Cubans for improved U.S.-Cuba relations, especially after Obama's election, but popular support for the embargo is still strong.

Key Information

• The transition from Fidel to Raul is ongoing and incomplete.
• Economic reform is limited and cautious, with a focus on stability rather than change.
• Venezuela and China are now primary trade partners, while Spain and Canada have diminished roles.
• U.S. engagement with Cuba is seen as beneficial for both countries, especially in disaster management, alternative energy, and agricultural cooperation.
• Cuban society is not supportive of political change, and opposition is limited and non-credible.
• The FAR and Communist Party are the main institutions that will drive change in the future.

Implications for U.S. Policy

• The U.S. should consider engagement with Cuba, even under an authoritarian regime.
• Trade and tourism with Cuba could improve living standards and economic conditions.
• People-to-people ties and cultural exchanges are important tools for building trust.
• Sanctions have failed to promote democracy or human rights, and their continuation may harm U.S. interests.
• A new approach should focus on cooperation and confidence-building, rather than regime change.

Conclusion

Cuba's future remains uncertain, with limited political reform and economic stagnation. The U.S. has an opportunity to engage constructively with Cuba, which could lead to improved relations and mutual benefits, especially in areas like disaster response, energy, and education. The report emphasizes the need for a realistic and flexible U.S. policy that acknowledges the complexities of the Cuban regime and the potential for cooperation.