2014年-世界发展银行全球_Moldova_Financial_Sector_Assessment_Program___Bank_Crisis_Resolution_27页_867kb

报告摘要

Republic of Moldova Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP) - Bank Crisis Resolution Summary

Core Content Overview

This document outlines the findings and recommendations of the IMF-World Bank Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP) mission to the Republic of Moldova, conducted in February 2014. The focus is on the country's bank crisis resolution framework, highlighting its strengths, vulnerabilities, and gaps.

Main Vulnerabilities and Concerns

Concentration in the Banking System

The banking system is highly concentrated, dominated by 6 domestic banks, 4 of which are relatively large.
These banks form two groups, with a combined market share of 60–70% of banking system assets.
Two of the banks have significant large exposure risks, with aggregate exposures far exceeding their capital.
Foreign currency loans represent a potential credit risk vulnerability, as identified by stress testing.

Too Big to Fail Risk

The concentration of assets among a few banks raises too big to fail (TBTF) concerns.
Low deposit insurance cap (MDL 6,000) exacerbates the risk of contagion in the event of a bank failure.

Progress and Existing Framework

National Committee for Financial Stability (NCFS)

Established in 2010 by Government Decision No. 449.
Composed of key government agencies, including the Government, NBM, MOF, MOE, DGF, and NCFM.
Technical Sub-Committee chaired by the Minister of Finance to coordinate crisis resolution efforts.
A Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) outlines guiding principles and responsibilities of member agencies.

NBM's Role and Legal Powers

The National Bank of Moldova (NBM) is the primary resolution authority.
The Law on Financial Institutions grants the NBM powers such as:
- Placing banks under special supervision.
- Issuing binding directions to banks.
- Appointing a special administrator.
- Facilitating recapitalization and business transfer.
- Providing liquidity support.

Key Gaps and Deficiencies

Legal Powers

Uncertainty in the scope of the NBM’s direction power, especially regarding business restructuring.
No power to appoint directors or management unless a special administrator is in place.
No statutory override for contractual obligations during business transfer or administrator appointment, risking contract termination and set-off rights.
Lack of legal authority to establish bridge banks or asset management vehicles.
No clear statutory power for the Government to provide funding, guarantees, or indemnities without Parliamentary approval.
No legal framework for bail-in or resolution of non-bank financial institutions.

Crisis Resolution Strategies and Procedures

No resolvability assessments or resolution plans have been developed for systemically important banks.
No internal guidance for rapid solvency assessment.
Limited planning for different resolution options, including least-cost recapitalization, bridge bank resolution, and group resolution.
Insufficient consideration of the legal processes and pre-positioning required for collateral recovery in a crisis.

Coordination and Capacity Building

Limited practical coordination between agencies, despite the NCFS framework.
No crisis simulation exercises have been conducted.
No staff training or senior-level workshops on crisis resolution strategies.
No cross-border MOUs with foreign bank authorities, hindering coordinated cross-border resolution.

Recommendations

Recommendation	Priority	Timeframe
1. Amend the Law on NBM to include an objective relating to financial stability	High	As soon as possible
2. Amend the Law on NBM to clearly state that the NBM is responsible for bank resolution	High	As soon as possible
3. Provide immunity from liability for NBM staff and agents in resolution actions, except in cases of bad faith or fraud	High	As soon as possible
4. Allow the NBM to provide indemnities to staff for legal costs and expenses	High	As soon as possible
5. Strengthen NBM's capacity for crisis resolution through guidance, training, and exercises	High	As soon as possible
6. Establish a working group within the NBM to develop detailed resolution plans	High	As soon as practicable
7. Enhance coordination between NBM, MOF, NCFM, and DGF	High	As soon as practicable
8. Strengthen the role of NBM in the NCFS Technical Sub-Committee	High	As soon as practicable
9. Ensure banks are pre-positioned for collateralised liquidity support	High	As soon as practicable
10. Review and amend resolution powers for banks, insurers, and FMIs	High (banks) / Medium (others)	As soon as practicable (banks) / Medium-term (others)
11. Regularly review bank recovery plans and assess pre-positioning requirements	High	As soon as practicable
12. Develop resolvability assessments for all systemically important banks	High	As soon as practicable
13. Establish early warning indicators for financial system stress	High	As soon as practicable
14. Review solvency assessment framework and test under time pressure	High	As soon as practicable
15. Develop bank resolution strategies and contingency plans in collaboration with relevant agencies	High	As soon as practicable
16. Develop resolution strategies and plans for non-bank financial institutions	Medium	Medium-term
17. Strengthen coordination between NCFS agencies	High	As soon as practicable
18. Establish MOUs with home authorities for cross-border resolution	Medium	Medium-term
19. Conduct regular crisis simulation exercises with external stakeholders	High	As soon as practicable
20. Assess funding arrangements and consider establishing a financial stability fund	High	As soon as practicable

Conclusion

The Republic of Moldova has made initial progress in establishing a coordinated framework for financial crisis resolution, particularly through the NCFS and NBM. However, the legal and procedural gaps significantly undermine the effectiveness and timeliness of crisis resolution. A comprehensive review and strengthening of legal powers, enhanced coordination between agencies, and capacity building through training and simulations are critical to improving the resilience of the financial sector. The NBM must take a stronger leadership role, and the Government should prioritize legal reforms to ensure a robust and efficient resolution framework.