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OECD Guidelines for Fighting Bid Rigging in Public Procurement (2025 Update) Summary

Core Content

The OECD Guidelines for Fighting Bid Rigging in Public Procurement (2025 Update) are designed to help public and private procurement entities prevent and detect bid rigging. These guidelines are based on the OECD Recommendation on Fighting Bid Rigging in Public Procurement [OECD-LEGAL-0396], which was updated in 2023. The document outlines key principles, checklists, and strategies to promote fair competition in public procurement and reduce the risks of collusive bidding.

Main Objectives

• Promote effective competition in public procurement.
• Reduce the risk of bid rigging.
• Facilitate the detection of bid-rigging cartels.
• Support the enforcement of competition law.

Key Messages

• Bid rigging involves companies conspiring to manipulate bids, often in secret, to raise prices or lower quality, which undermines the competitive process and harms public services and taxpayers.
• The Recommendation highlights that bid rigging is one of the most serious violations of competition law and can be combined with other unlawful activities such as corruption and fraud.
• The Guidelines provide a Tender Design List and a Bid-Rigging Detection List to help procurement and competition authorities take proactive and reactive measures against bid rigging.
• Inter-institutional co-operation is essential, with competition authorities needing to work closely with procurement, anti-corruption, audit, and law enforcement bodies.

Forms of Bid Rigging

1. Cover Bidding: Submitting bids that are known to be rejected to create the illusion of competition.
2. Bid Suppression: Competitors agreeing to not bid or to withdraw bids to ensure a specific company wins.
3. Bid Rotation: Companies taking turns being the winning bidder in a rotating manner.
4. Market Allocation: Dividing the market among competitors to avoid competing for certain customers or contracts.

Compensation Mechanisms

Cartels often use compensation mechanisms to distribute illegal profits among members. These include:

• Subcontracts or supply contracts from the designated winner.
• Monetary payments, which may be disguised through fraudulent invoices.
• Long-term arrangements with complex profit-sharing and monitoring systems.

Market Characteristics That Facilitate Collusion

Supply-Side Factors:

• High market concentration: Few suppliers make collusion easier.
• Symmetry among market participants: Similar cost structures and market shares encourage collusive agreements.
• Little or no market entry: High barriers to entry reduce competitive pressure.
• Economic shocks or declining demand: May incentivize collusion to replace lost revenue.
• Industry or trade associations: May serve as meeting points for collusive discussions.
• Identical or simple goods, works, or services: Easier to collude on pricing.
• Few substitutes: Increases the likelihood of successful collusion.
• Little innovation: Leads to similar products and easier coordination.

Demand-Side Factors:

• Predictable demand: Increases the risk of collusion due to regular bidding opportunities.
• Repetitive bidding: Encourages collusive schemes as bidders can coordinate on contract allocation.
• Strong focus on price: Simplifies the process of colluding on pricing.

Checklists for Prevention and Detection

Tender Design List

This checklist includes the following key measures to reduce bid rigging risks:

• Be informed about the market and potential suppliers.
• Maximize the participation of genuine competitors.
• Define requirements clearly and avoid predictability.
• Reduce communication among bidders and share information carefully.
• Choose evaluation and award criteria that promote competition.
• Clarify bid rigging risks in tender documents.

Bid-Rigging Detection List

This list highlights red flags that may indicate bid rigging and includes:

• Unusual bidding or pricing patterns.
• Suspicious bidder conduct or statements.
• Indicators of collusion such as coordinated bidding or market division.
• Steps that procurement officials can take if bid rigging is suspected, including reporting to competition authorities and using digital tools for analysis.

Inter-Institutional Co-operation

• Competition authorities should establish formal and informal co-operation with procurement and other public authorities.
• Steps include setting up working groups, sharing information, and enabling staff exchanges.
• Data standardisation and data sharing agreements are encouraged to support investigations.
• Domestic and international co-operation instruments should be signed to enhance cross-border enforcement.

Training and Awareness

• Procurement officials must be trained on competition law and cartel detection.
• Training should cover:
  • Standardisation and collection of procurement information.
  • Use of tools to detect bid rigging.
  • Sanctions and leniency policies.
  • Whistleblower mechanisms.
• Awareness of red flags and collusive patterns is essential for early detection.

Conclusion

The OECD Guidelines are a comprehensive tool for public and private procurement entities to combat bid rigging. They emphasize the importance of smart tender design, red flag recognition, and inter-agency collaboration. By following these guidelines, authorities can enhance transparency, fairness, and efficiency in procurement processes, ultimately benefiting public services, taxpayers, and final users.