2012年-世界发展银行全球_Domestic_Emissions_Trading___Existing_and_Proposed_Schemes_15页_1mb

报告摘要

Domestic Emissions Trading Schemes Summary

Core Content

This document provides an overview of key characteristics, design elements, and lessons learned from existing and proposed domestic emissions trading schemes (ETS). It evaluates five major schemes: the European Union ETS (EU ETS), New Zealand ETS (NZ ETS), Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), California ETS (CalETS), and Australia's Clean Energy Future (AusCPM), as well as the Tokyo Cap and Trade Program (TokyoC&T). The summary includes insights on coverage and scope, setting the cap, points of obligation, allowance allocation, monitoring, reporting, and verification (MRV), compliance mechanisms, and market stability.

Main Characteristics of Schemes

Coverage and Scope

EU ETS: Covers 30 countries (27 EU member states, Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Norway), approximately 45% of the EU’s CO₂ emissions, and includes about 11,000 installations. It expands over time to include aviation, bulk organic chemicals, ammonia, aluminium, N₂O, and PFCs.
NZ ETS: Covers all Kyoto Protocol GHGs and all sectors, with staggered entry. By 2015, it aims to cover the entire economy. Includes deforestation, energy, transport, industry, and agriculture.
RGGI: Covers 10 northeastern U.S. states, focusing on CO₂ emissions from fossil-fuel powered electricity generation (≥25 MW).
CalETS: Covers about 350 businesses and 600 facilities, with gradual expansion to include all major sources (85% of California’s GHG emissions) by 2020.
AusCPM: Covers CO₂, methane, nitrous oxide, and PFCs, targeting about 500 businesses (60% of Australia’s GHG emissions).
TokyoC&T: Covers approximately 40% of Tokyo’s commercial and industrial sector emissions (20% of total CO₂ emissions), including 1000 commercial buildings and 300 industrial facilities.

Setting the Cap

The cap is the total number of allowances available in a compliance period, set on an absolute tonnes basis.
EU ETS: Phases 1 and 2 had national allocation plans, with Phase 3 introducing a linear reduction factor of 1.74% annually.
NZ ETS: No separate cap, nested within Kyoto Protocol. Focus on competitiveness and emissions intensity.
RGGI: Stabilizes emissions at 188 million short tons annually from 2009–2014, then declines by 2.5% annually.
CalETS: The cap is set at 2% below 2012 forecast levels, declining by 2% in 2014 and 3% annually from 2015–2020.
AusCPM: No cap during the fixed price period (2012–2015); after that, an annual cap is set with input from the Climate Change Authority.
TokyoC&T: Aims for a 6% reduction in the first compliance period (2010–2014), with a stricter 17% target in the second (2015–2019).

Points of Obligation

Entities required to surrender allowances based on their emissions.
EU ETS: Downstream entities, including medium and large sources.
NZ ETS: Upstream in the energy sector, downstream in industry and transport.
RGGI: Fossil fuel-fired electricity generators.
CalETS: Large industrial facilities and electric utilities.
AusCPM: Downstream entities, including those in energy, industry, and transport.
TokyoC&T: Downstream entities, including commercial buildings, district heating/cooling, and factories.

Allocation of Allowances

Two main methods: gratis allocation (based on historical emissions or benchmarks) and selling allowances (via auction).
EU ETS: Phases 1 and 2 used mostly gratis allocation, but Phase 3 introduced auctioning for most sectors.
NZ ETS: Points of obligation must buy allowances from the market, with some gratis allocations for competitiveness-at-risk sectors.
RGGI: At least 25% of allowances are auctioned, with 90% allocated through quarterly auctions.
CalETS: Initially gratis for large industrial facilities and electric utilities, with planned auctioning.
AusCPM: Auctioning is the primary method, with transitional assistance for key sectors.
TokyoC&T: Grandfathering based on past emissions, with a new entrants reserve for new buildings.

MRV and Compliance

EU ETS: Requires approved monitoring plans, national emissions authorities for verification, and annual public reporting. Penalties for non-compliance are €100/tonne plus make-up of short allowances.
NZ ETS: Voluntary data collection initially, followed by mandatory reporting. Third-party verification not required, but audits are possible. Penalties include fines and imprisonment.
RGGI: Quarterly monitoring and reporting, with surrender at the end of the compliance period. Penalties are typically 3:1.
CalETS: Annual reporting, third-party verification, and penalties for missing surrender deadlines or having a shortfall.
AusCPM: MRV and compliance rules are managed by the Clean Energy Regulator, starting in April 2012.
TokyoC&T: Annual reporting to the governor, third-party verification, and penalties for non-compliance.

Enabling Trading and Fostering Stability

Most schemes have a soft take-off phase, with a period of voluntary monitoring and reporting before the first compliance period.
Carryover of unused allowances is generally allowed to stabilize the market and incentivize early compliance.
Compliance periods are typically multi-year, with some schemes allowing phased entry of sectors.
Price control mechanisms are used in NZ ETS and AusCPM, though NZ ETS found them unnecessary.
Market liquidity and transparency are essential for effective trading and price discovery.
Market stability is influenced by the balance between banking provisions and non-banking approaches, and by the government’s role in facilitating market readiness.

Key Insights and Lessons

Cap setting must consider reference emissions and complementary policies.
Gratis allocation can lead to windfall profits and market distortions, but is sometimes necessary for competitiveness.
MRV and compliance are critical to the integrity of the scheme, requiring robust monitoring, reporting, and verification.
Phased entry and soft take-off help manage market volatility and ensure smooth implementation.
Market mechanisms such as trading platforms, legal contracts, and insurance services are important for market development.
Price stability is a concern, and mechanisms like offsets and price ceilings/floors can help manage this.

Conclusion

Each scheme reflects the unique national and regional circumstances of its jurisdiction. While the EU ETS and NZ ETS have faced challenges like price collapses and windfall profits, they have also provided valuable lessons on the importance of cap design, allowance allocation, and market stability. The RGGI, CalETS, AusCPM, and TokyoC&T demonstrate varying approaches to sector coverage, allowance allocation, and market facilitation, emphasizing the need for flexibility, transparency, and policy coherence in the design and implementation of ETS.