2024-11-10-国际清算银行-经济胁迫与分裂理论（英）_87页_2mb

报告摘要

The paper analyzes how hegemonic powers (e.g., US, China) exert economic influence through coercion and how target countries respond with anti-coercion policies, potentially leading to inefficient fragmentation.
Key challenge: Formalizes economic coercion as a strategic tool while integrating traditional gains from global integration.
Focus: Dual role of the hegemon—provider of global public goods and extractor of rents.

A Stackelberg model with a hegemon (e.g., US) and multiple target countries.
The hegemon uses coercive threats (e.g., sanctions, cutoffs of financial access) to extract concessions through take-it-or-leave-it contracts.
Target countries implement anti-coercion policies (e.g., subsidies for alternatives, restrictions on foreign inputs) to bolster outside-options.

Hegemon's Power: Derived from production externalities (strategic complementarities, economies of scale). Dominant actors face limited substitutes for inputs.
Anti-Coercion Tradeoff: Countries balance gains from trade/global integration with economic security by insulating against foreign influence.
Fragmentation Doom Loop: Uncoordinated anti-coercion policies by multiple countries lead to inefficient global fragmentation ("every country over-insulates").

Global planner's efficient allocation vs. hegemonic outcome: Hegecons distort to build power, reducing overall efficiency.
Non-cooperative outcomes without hegemonic influence may dominate fragmented scenarios, highlighting the inefficiency of fragmentation.

Countries aim to shape the global economy to minimize vulnerability to hegemonic influence, focusing on strategic sectors (e.g., semiconductors, financial services).
Policy tools include industrial subsidies, trade barriers, and financial infrastructure development (e.g., CIPS in China).

Countries should maximize firms' outside-options, internalizing how ex-ante policies limit the hegemon's ability to extract.
Sharp result: Each country would optimally "fully fragment" in response to coercion (e.g., prohibiting use of hegemon's financial services).

Financial services exhibit strong strategic complementarities (e.g., SWIFT-like systems). U.S. dominance provides coercive leverage.
Anti-coercion policies often target alternative systems (e.g., CIPS in China), which remain inefficient substitutes.
Analysis extends to general model, e.g., showing that China relies more on trade (goods) while U.S. power derives disproportionately from finance.

Hegemon incentivizes hyper-globalization (favoring its system) to increase power extraction.
Financial fragmentation (e.g., US sanctions on Russia or Huawei) may destroy global gains from integration.

Geoeconomic power measures the economic loss a country suffers if cutoff from a hegemon's inputs.
Key inputs: Expenditure shares, input elasticities, and strategic complementarities.

U.S. power heavily depends on financial services (not just goods trade).
Chinese power derives more from goods, but uncertain due to measurement challenges for services and banking.

Uncoordinated anti-coercion policies globally tend toward inefficient fragmentation.
The hegemonic power to extract "value" from global integration poses risks, even in the absence of a formal hegemon, through subtle geopolitical preferences and trade diversion.
Critical recommendation: Countries should coordinate anti-coercion efforts to avoid collective inefficiency.

Lemmas and propositions detail Stackelberg timing, optimal contracts, and network effects.
Extensions cover government coercion, bargaining power, and punishment credibility.

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